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ABSTRACT*
Agricultural production in the United States, through its intensive use o f nitrogen fertilizer, has 
contributed to nitrate accumulation in groundwater. Concern over this contamination has led to increased public 
interest in schemes designed to reduce nitrate leachate from agricultural lands. This research compares the costs 
o f alternative regulatory policies in an area o f the Com Belt with those for an area o f the Northeast.
The bioeconomic models of agricultural production and nitrate leaching are used to compare alternative 
policy instruments. They include soil-specific leaching and productivity characteristics, variables for management 
response, the dynamic nature o f  nitrogen movement through the soil, and the stochastic influence o f precipitation 
on both net farm revenue and nitrate leaching. The models include state variables for nitrogen levels in the crop 
root zone and control variables for nitrogen fertilizer application and crop rotations. Nitrate leaching is restricted 
using a chance constraint, thus in some sense minimizing the probability o f worst-case leaching scenarios.
Six alternative regulatory policies are compared empirically in two specific regions: Boone County in 
Iowa and Genesee and Wyoming Counties in New York. The policies, which are designed to reduce expected 
annual leachate by 10% and 25% in each region, include a tax on nitrogen fertilizer, quantity restrictions on both 
fertilizer and leachate, and three forms o f leachate permits. The three permit schemes are permits sold by a 
regulatory agency at a fixed price, permits auctioned by a regulatory agency, and tradable permits initially 
allocated at no cost to farmers with the initial distribution based on historic leachate levels.
The empirical analysis shows that costs o f achieving a regional reduction in leachate are greater in Iowa 
than in New York. Within a region, the net cost o f reducing regional leachate (the net cost being the cost to 
farmers less any public revenues generated) is the least under the three permit schemes, although the costs of 
other policies are generally not substantially greater. The ranking of the net costs o f these other policies differs 
by region and by the percent reduction in leachate. While net costs are the least under all three permit schemes, 
two o f the three schemes result in substantial transfers o f money from the farming community to the public 
treasury. In addition, a case is made for using a tradable permit scheme in targeted areas in and around major 
groundwater sources that are highly susceptible to contamination.
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INTRODUCTION
Both the increasing public awareness of the extent of surface and groundwater pollution 
and the associated human health hazards have elevated concerns over the quality of our 
nation’s water supply. Point sources of water contamination, such as industrial dumping of 
wastes or the leaching of chemicals from abandoned waste disposal sites, are easy to identify 
and are frequently reported in the press. Less is known about the extent to which non-point 
sources of contamination exacerbate the problem. While national studies (Nielson and Lee, 
1987; Kellog et al., 1992) suggest that non-point agricultural sources contribute to the 
seriousness of the nation’s groundwater problems (particularly in the Midwest, southeastern 
coastal plains, and western irrigated farming areas), there remains substantial disagreement as 
to how widespread the chemical contamination is and the extent to which it is due to the 
agricultural industry. Even if contamination is concentrated in a small proportion of the 
groundwater supplies or in shallow or regional aquifers, the potential groundwater 
contamination from agriculture cannot be ignored since it is estimated that over 50 million 
people in the United States obtain drinking water from groundwater sources (Neilson and Lee, 
1987).1
In placing this relatively recent concern over groundwater contamination in proper 
perspective, it is important to remember that prior to World War II, production agriculture was 
much less dependent on chemical inputs than it is today. Pest and weed problems were 
eradicated by crop rotations; additional nutrients came primarily from manure and legume 
crops. While these practices are still used widely, chemical use has increased dramatically. 
According to Osteen et al. (1989), insecticides are used on approximately 35% of com acreage 
nationally while herbicides are used on 90% of the com and soybean acreage. Chemical 
fertilization, especially with nitrogen, is standard for most non-legume field crops.
The trend toward chemical-intensive agriculture began with the invention of synthetic 
organic pesticides, inexpensive technology for producing nitrogen fertilizer, and the
1 Independent estimates by the U.S. Geological Survey (1988) suggest that over half of the 
drinking water consumed in the United States is from groundwater sources.
2development of new crop varieties responsive to fertilizer. Through declining production costs 
of chemical inputs and rising relative prices of other agricultural inputs, farmers faced strong 
incentives to substitute chemicals for other inputs. Government policy also contributed to the 
chemical intensification of agriculture through implementing farm programs designed to sustain 
agricultural prices and providing public research aimed predominantly at intensification.
Because of these trends in agricultural production, some believe that farmers are largely 
responsible for the health threat posed by groundwater contamination. Yet agricultural 
producers are often at greater risk than consumers. According to the Scientific Advisory 
Committee of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), worker exposure to toxic chemicals 
ranks among its higher risk problems (EPA, 1992). Due to this risk, increased government 
regulation, and higher chemical prices, the factors affecting farmers’ use of chemicals are more 
complex than in years past. For example, farmers have implemented alternative management 
strategies, such as reduced tillage systems and integrated pest management systems, and 
practiced conservation measures, such as terraced slopes with seeded waterways and filter strips 
along water channels, to diminish the amount of pollutants entering the water supply.
Groundwater Policies and Programs
In response to concerns over the environment by both consumer and producer groups, 
many national and state environmental policies are being developed to address these issues 
(Fox et ah, 1991). For example, 44 states have groundwater protection strategies (EPA, 1992), 
some of which go beyond the national regulations embodied in the "Clean Water" and "Safe 
Drinking Water" Acts of 1972 and 1974 and their subsequent amendments.
The "Clean Water" Act’s initial, major objective was to provide a safe surface water 
supply, although some provisions were made for protecting groundwater supplies. One such 
provision required states to submit annual reports (now biennial) on water quality, including 
groundwater quality, to the EPA Administrator. Section 208 required the EPA to develop 
information on the nature and extent of non-point sources of water pollution, including 
groundwater. Although the act included these provisions for groundwater protection, no safety 
standards for specific contaminants were identified.
On the other hand, the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) directly addressed safety 
standards for contaminants in drinking water. Accordingly, it has become the predominant act 
for regulating contaminants in groundwater. Under the SDWA, the EPA was required to set 
non-enforceable maximum contaminant level (MCL) goals for groundwater contaminants such
3that if they were attained, no adverse effect on human health would arise. Enforceable 
maximum contaminant levels were then set as close to the MCL goals as feasible, with 
feasibility determined by the availability, performance, and cost of treatment technologies.
Other groundwater legislation includes the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA) of 1976, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act (CERCLA) of 1980, and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). 
RCRA’s main objective was to establish cleanup and management standards to prevent 
contaminant release into aquifers from municipal solid and hazardous waste. CERCLA, or 
Superfund, enacted cleanup legislation for inactive waste disposal sites. FIFRA protects 
groundwater by controlling pesticide use through registration and certification procedures.
In supporting these specific legislative initiatives, several groundwater protection 
programs have also been implemented by government agencies and have contributed to 
improving groundwater quality. The Groundwater Protection Strategy developed in 1984 and 
the Groundwater Task Force established in 1989 sought to better integrate source specific 
control and cleanup programs into a more comprehensive policy at the state and national levels. 
The National Pesticide Survey was conducted in the mid-1980’s in order to determine the 
extent of pesticide and nitrate contamination in public and private drinking water wells. Both 
President Bush’s Water Quality Initiative in his 1990 budget proposal and the Pesticides in 
Groundwater Strategy adopted in 1991 sought to determine the extent of groundwater pollution 
resulting from agricultural practices and to provide farmers with the knowledge and technical 
means to voluntarily address environmental concerns. The Food, Agriculture, Conservation 
and Trade Act of 1990 (1990 Farm Bill), contains substantial provisions for protecting water 
quality. Within the bill, the Conservation Reserve Program, the Wetland Reserve Program, the 
Water Quality Incentives Program, and other measures seek to improve water quality. Dates, 
sites, and amounts of certain pesticides must now be recorded by chemical applicators. Some 
states have adopted taxes on nitrogen fertilizer in an effort to obtain monetary resources for 
future groundwater clean-up of nitrate contamination (Wise and Johnson, 1991).
Although our knowledge of the physical and economic dimensions of water pollution 
continues to expand rapidly (Fox et al., 1991; Osteen et al., 1981; McCarl, 1981), a number 
of significant obstacles remain to successful implementation of policies to deal with 
groundwater contamination, all of which require additional research. In order to calculate the 
socially optimal level of environmental quality, one needs to know the value of environmental 
quality and the costs of reducing agricultural chemical usage. Techniques do exist for valuing 
the environment (e.g., Randall, 1987) and have been implemented empirically, (e.g. Jordan and
4Elnagheeb, 1993; Poe, 1993; Poe and Bishop, 1992; Sun et al., 1992; Sun, 1990; Edwards, 
1988; and Malone and Barrows, 1990), but it is difficult to value an environmental 
improvement for large regions by generalizing results from the small area studies. In addition, 
it is difficult to determine the extent and sources of pollution. Even the most complex 
biophysical transport models have difficulty predicting contamination levels, and they require 
detailed data. Determining the source of pollution is equally complex.
These difficulties imply that regulating groundwater quality would be costly and 
administratively problematic. As an alternative, policy makers have pursued policies 
regulating agricultural inputs associated with groundwater contamination, but these policies are 
not without their problems, and their effectiveness has not yet been substantiated. Taxing or 
restricting the amount of input purchased may not control the intensity with which chemicals 
are used on cropland. This underscores the importance of research to establish relationships 
between application of fertilizer and other agricultural chemicals and their appearance in 
ground or surface water across major soil groups. It is also important to understand more 
about production alternatives in response to higher chemical prices and regulation.
Focus o f the Study
Although there is concern for contamination from numerous agricultural chemicals and 
fertilizers, the focus of this study is on the most widespread among agricultural pollutants in 
groundwater, water soluble nitrates (Nielsen and Lee, 1987). In 1990, 37 of 42 states and 
territories reporting stated that nitrates were their most frequently observed groundwater 
contaminant (EPA, 1992). Within the United States, modem varieties of crops such as com, 
grain sorghum, and wheat require large amounts of nitrogen in order to stimulate plant growth 
and yields. Some of this nitrogen is made available from crop residues, the application of 
animal waste, or, perhaps most importantly today, the application of commercial nitrogen 
fertilizer. Since not all nitrogen available in the soil is utilized by the plants, residual nitrogen 
can remain in the soil and carry over for use in crop production the following year; some can 
leach below the crop root zone and later accumulate in underground aquifers; or some can 
accumulate in surface water as a result of soil erosion.
As stated above, three regions of the United States are particularly susceptible to nitrate 
contamination in groundwater. The Corn Belt is highly susceptible to such pollution (Kellog 
et al., 1992) because it produces more than 70% of the nation’s com and soybeans 
(Agricultural Statistics 1992). Despite potential problems in large concentrated areas like the 
Com Belt, localized regions elsewhere are susceptible to contamination as well.
5Economic research related to nitrate contamination of surface and groundwater dates 
back to the early 1970’s. Few studies of nitrate accumulation in surface or groundwater have 
attempted to examine the impact of regulation on a national scale. Most studies have involved 
regional or representative linear programming models that examine the effects of limiting 
nitrogen use through taxation or regulation on production patterns, farm profitability, and on 
social welfare, as measured by the sum of consumers’ and producers’ surplus less the variable 
costs of production (e.g., Taylor and Frohberg, 1977; Taylor et al., 1978; Heady and Vocke, 
1979; Swanson and Taylor, 1977; Huang and Lantin, 1993).
More recently, Lambert (1990) sought to distinguish the effects of sales tax and quantity 
restrictions on nitrogen fertilizer on optimal crop rotations of cotton, corn, wheat, and sugar 
beets in Arizona, taking into account the effect of a farmer’s aversion to risk. He found that 
the expected return under a nitrogen quantity restriction was greater than that under a nitrogen 
sales tax, but the differences in expected returns decreased as the level of risk aversion 
increased. Risk is also a central focus of the theoretical studies by Kim and Hostetler (1991) 
and Kim et al. (1993) which estimate the net benefits of nitrogen use in the context of a 
dynamic model with water quality constraints. In their models, they include chance constraints 
on water quality such that nitrates in surface and groundwater do not exceed EPA’s MCL with 
given probabilities. Taxes on nitrogen fertilizer and subsidies for reduced fertilizer use were 
also imposed in order to reduce nitrate runoff and leaching. The importance of their work is 
to demonstrate the need to incorporate the dynamics of nitrogen application and annual 
carryover into any empirical analysis of nitrogen leachate and runoff. If one disregards this 
time dimension in the model, the tax and subsidy programs result in over- or under-protection 
from nitrate contaminants in groundwater.
Despite past efforts, empirical studies that account specifically for the relationship 
between application rates and actual amounts of nitrogen runoff and leachate are relatively 
recent and have been made possible primarily because of recent advances in nutrient transport 
models. One of the early studies of this kind examined the feasibility of using the output from 
one of these transport models (CREAMS) to provide the agrichemical components to a 
representative farm linear programming model to simulate the effects of changes in farm 
practices on agricultural chemical losses and farm income (Crowder et al., 1984). Taylor et 
al. (1992) have also incorporated output from an off-the-shelf biophysical simulation model, 
commonly known as EPIC, into linear programming models for five representative farms in 
the Willamette Valley. Similar work has been conducted for New York (Schmit, 1994).
6Two detailed economic studies of regulating nitrates in groundwater are by Johnson et 
al. (1991) and Mapp et al. (1994). In the former, the authors, linked the results of a soil- 
specific dynamic programming model to a farm-level linear programming model to determine 
optimal crop production under various forms of nitrate regulation. Specifically, a dynamic 
programming model utilizing CERES (Hodges et al., 1989; Jones and Kiniry, 1986; Ritchie 
et al., 1985) crop and leaching simulation models determined optimal water and fertilizer 
applications within a growing season and the resulting crop yields. Nitrate leaching was also 
traced via the simulation model. After solving the dynamic programming model, the results 
were used in a linear programming model to determine optimal crop rotations under policies 
of nitrogen fertilizer taxes and regulation as well as direct regulation and Pigovian taxes on 
nitrates in the groundwater. Mapp et al. (1994), linked a crop growth/chemical transport model 
to a regional linear programming model and an aquifer model to examine the distribution of 
nitrate movements in response to restrictions and targeted policies in the central high plains.
In examining this previous research, we learn a great deal about the effects of 
commonly analyzed forms of environmental regulations, such as a tax or quantity restriction 
on pollution, as well as the nature of the essential components of a model for effective policy 
analysis. However, little attention has been given to more innovative, market-oriented 
regulatory tools, such as pollution permits (EPA, 1993, pp. 17-19), none of which has been 
within an analytical framework that is soil specific and accounts simultaneously for 
management responses, year-to-year nitrogen carryover, and the inherent uncertainty in both 
agricultural production and nitrate leaching.
Research Objectives
This research contributes to our knowledge of the biophysical and economic 
relationships between nitrogen fertilizer application rates, leachate, crop production, farm 
income, and environmental policy. Attention is focussed on dynamic aspects of the problem 
and the inherent risk in meeting environmental standards due to variability in weather and other 
factors affecting nitrate leaching. A soil-specific, stochastic, dynamic bioeconomic model of 
agricultural production is developed that maximizes farm profits resulting from the production 
of common crops within particular geographic regions while limiting nitrate leachate below the 
crop root zone. This model is used to: a) determine the effects on optimal crop rotations, 
nitrogen fertilizer use, and net farm income for specific soils of setting upper limits on the 
probability of serious nitrate leaching; and b) compare specific nitrate regulatory policies, such 
as a sales tax on nitrogen fertilizer, quantity restrictions on nitrogen fertilizer application or 
leachate, and various pollution permit schemes.
7These comparisons of leachate and the probability levels and the various policies are 
empirically evaluated for typical agriculture and soils in a region of the Corn Belt, where 
nitrate leaching problems are thought to be severe, and in a region of the Northeast, where 
leaching problems are thought to be less widespread (Kellog et al., 1992). Emphasis 
throughout the analysis is focussed on the implications for crop rotations, fertilizer use, farm 
income, and the distributional effects among farmers and between the farm and public sectors. 
Some attention is given to the administrative difficulties surrounding each of the various 
policies. The results have implications for implementing national policies to control nitrate 
leaching where soils and agricultural production differ widely across regions.
The remainder of this bulletin is organized into six additional sections. To place the 
empirical analysis into theoretical perspective, the next section compares the minimum cost 
method of achieving an effluent standard with taxes on the effluent and the polluting input, 
uniform effluent and polluting input restrictions, and two schemes of effluent permits. This 
is followed by a presentation of the bioeconomic models of typical agriculture production in 
New York and Corn Belt states, and a section describing the estimation of the crop production 
functions, nitrogen carryover parameters, nitrogen leaching relationships, etc. needed for the 
empirical applications of the models. Section 5 examines the solutions to the bioeconomic 
models for different soils in Iowa and New York, and it is followed by a comparative analysis 
of a tax on nitrogen fertilizer, quantity restrictions on both nitrogen fertilizer and nitrate 
leachate, and a system of nitrate pollution permits. The final section summarizes the policy 
implications, including problems associated with implementing the various regulatory policies.
A STANDARDS APPROACH TO REGULATING AN ENVIRONMENTAL EXTERNALITY
When the nitrate concentration in an underground aquifer increases because of leaching 
from nitrogen fertilizer applied by agricultural producers, the health risks to consumers from 
drinking water from that aquifer may rise as well. This situation is a classic example of a 
negative externality in that actions taken by one or more parties affect the technology, 
consumption set, or preferences of one or more other parties (Buchanan and Stubblebine, 
1962). Zilberman and Marra (1993) argue that the absence of externalities is one of the first- 
best conditions under which a competitive equilibrium is also a Pareto efficient resource 
allocation. This results from the fact that externalities are not accounted for in the marketplace.
Pigou (1932), using an interventionist approach, and Coase (1960), using an approach 
involving negotiation among parties, provided the foundation for determining conditions under
8which the socially optimal resource allocation can be achieved in the presence of an 
externality.2 While theoretical results provide important guidelines for policy, the conditions 
required by Coase and Pigou in the resolution of externalities rarely, if ever, exist in reality. 
Information, for example, may be limited, and the exact nature of the relationships between 
production and the externality may be uncertain. Costs of negotiation may be prohibitive.
This is particularly true for non-point source pollution, such as nitrates leaching from 
agricultural production. There is no way to know the socially optimal level of nitrates in 
groundwater. The social benefits of the improved environmental quality to both current and 
future generations are unknown, largely because of the uncertain health effects associated with 
the ingestion of nitrates. The non-point source nature of the problem adds to the uncertainty 
in estimating the social costs and benefits and complicates the enforcement of property rights 
because the relationship between agricultural production and groundwater contamination 
depends on many factors, some of which change randomly from year to year.
While there are methods for valuing environmental quality, estimates are generally 
derived for small areas and are difficult to generalize for use in setting regional or national 
policy. Therefore, as a basis for the empirical analysis of nitrogen leaching below, this section 
is devoted to a discussion of the standards approach proposed by Baumol and Oates (1971), 
as a second-best alternative to deal with environmental externalities. Under the approach, a 
regulatory policy is needed to achieve a regional effluent (pollution) standard.
Before applying this type of approach to the case of nitrate contamination, it is 
important to understand at a theoretical level the relative efficiency and implications for 
resource allocation of a number of alternative specifications of the standards approach. Six 
alternative policies are examined, including: taxing the effluent and the effluent-producing 
input, quantity restrictions on the effluent and effluent-producing input, effluent permits sold 
by a regulatory agency at a fixed price, and tradable effluent permits initially allocated by a 
regulatory agency.
A Graphical Analysis
Under the standards approach suggested by Baumol and Oates (1971), the government 
sets a regional target or standard for effluent. The target may be in terms of the total effluent
See Thomas (1994) for a detailed discussion.2
9emitted in the region, or it may be an effluent concentration level. To enforce this standard, 
the government must implement an effective policy tool, such as a tax or a direct regulation.
By comparing taxes to direct regulation, Baumol and Oates (1971) demonstrated that 
the choice of policy instrument under the standards approach should be made carefully. 
Different instruments can affect parties in different ways while achieving the same standard. 
To illustrate the distributional consequences, consider a tax and direct regulation depicted in 
Figure 1, where S(MPC) is a firm’s marginal private cost, or supply curve for a good, while 
D(MSB) is the marginal social benefit, or demand curve. Suppose that the government has 
determined an effluent standard for firms and that the level of output associated with the 
standard is Y1. If there is no policy, the firm will produce Y°. If the government levies a tax, 
t1, on the firm’s output to reduce it to Y1, the firm receives areas a + b. The firm pays tax 
equal to area c, and society incurs a dead-weight loss of area d + e. If Y1 is achieved through 
a direct quantity restriction on output at Y1, the firm receives areas a + b + c. No public 
revenues are generated, but the dead-weight loss to society is area d + e, the same as under the 
tax.
Three important results come from this illustration. First, both taxes and quantity 
restrictions can be used to achieve the effluent standard at the same social cost to society, area 
d + e. Second, this cost, area d + e, is the least cost that society incurs if the effluent
Price
Figure 1. Using a Tax to Achieve a Pollution Standard
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standard is achieved.3 Third, strong incentives exist for the parties generating negative 
externalities to lobby for direct regulations as opposed to taxes because they will receive larger 
revenues under a direct regulation (Buchanan and Tullock, 1975).
Theoretical Comparisons o f Policies to Achieve an Effluent Standard
Since Baumol and Oates’ original work, many analysts have compared policies designed 
to achieve effluent standards at a theoretical level. While Baumol and Oates (1971) concluded 
that effluent charges (taxes) and effluent standards (quantity restrictions) meet regional effluent 
standards at a minimum cost, Weitzman (1974) showed that this may not be the case if policy 
makers are uncertain as to how an industry will react to a regulation. Buchanan and Tullock 
(1975) were the first to emphasize that standards may be a more desired form of regulation to 
polluters because standards can result in economic rents to polluters.
The use of pollution permits to achieve a desired level of environmental quality has also 
been examined at the theoretical level (e.g., McGartland and Oates, 1985; Tietenberg, 1985; 
Krupnick et al., 1984; and Montgomery, 1972). Although these analyses often rely on different 
assumptions, they, along with Baumol and Oates (1988), demonstrate that a system of 
marketable permits can also achieve an effluent standard at least cost to society.
Taking a different approach, studies such as Helfand (1991), Besanko (1987), Harford 
and Karp (1983), and Thomas (1980) compared different forms of direct regulation, such as 
regulating pollution per unit of output, and pollution per unit of input, and pollution. They 
generally conclude that a mandate on pollution itself, rather than a mandate on some related 
alternative, leads to the most efficient resource allocation under an environmental standard.
Despite the value of these theoretical results, to date, there has been little attention given 
to comparing resource allocations associated with taxing or restricting an effluent-producing 
input with those of an effluent standard. It is to this task that we now turn.
The analysis begins with an abstract planner’s problem that minimizes the costs to 
farmers for specified levels of output when an effluent standard is imposed. The resource 
allocation (inputs used in production) from the solution to this problem is characterized and 
then compared to the resource allocations under alternative nitrate reducing policies. To
3 This assumes that the only way to reduce pollution is to reduce production, i.e. there 
is no pollution abatement equipment that a firm can install.
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maintain consistency in the policy comparisons, the output that a farmer must produce is held 
constant and is equal to that level specified in the planner’s problem.4
Minimum Cost to Farmers o f Achieving a Nitrate Standard
Consider a region in which j farmers (j = l,...,n) produce a crop, yj = fj(x,j ,...,xmj ,Sj;Vj) 
where f,J > 0, using the inputs x,j ,...,xmj and nitrogen fertilizer, Sj. Production of yj also 
depends on a vector of exogenous factors, vj5 including soil characteristics, precipitation, farm 
size and technology, etc. To produce the crop, nitrogen fertilizer used by farmer j, Sj, generates 
nitrate leachate, z J = z J(Sj ;vj) where zsJ > 0. Nitrate leachate also depends on Vj, which differs 
by farm, and any regulation is likely to affect the production and leachate differently.
Assume that a policy maker sets nitrate leachate at z*, representing a "best guess" at a 
socially optimal level. To meet this standard at minimum cost to farmers, we have:
min c = y ;
j=i
r s + V  r.x..s j i ij
subject to
fj(xlj?***5xmjsSjSVj) > yj* for j = l,...,n
n
J 2 z j(s.;vp < z *
j= i
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions to obtain a minimum for i = l,...,m and j = l,...,n are:
(1) k-fl-T.  < 0 , Xjj > 0, Xy (A.j f^ j -  r;) = 0
(2) A.TsJ- r s -p z sJ < 0, ^ > 0, S j ( X f sJ - r s-p z sJ) = 0
(3) f j - y ; > 0 ,  Xj >0,  A..(fj — yj*) = 0
4 The analysis assumes farmers produce the minimum level of output from the planner’s 
problem. The models are highly stylized to facilitate comparisons. They abstract from the 
time dimension of agricultural production and nitrate leaching explicitly built into the 
bioeconomic models used in the empirical analysis.
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(4) z * ~ I 3 z j( sj;vj) -  ° ’
j=i
where k- is the shadow price of increasing output for firm j, p. is the marginal cost of making 
the nitrate standard more stringent, fjj is the partial derivative of fJ with respect to x;j, fsj is the 
partial derivative of f j with respect to Sj, and zj  is the derivative of z j with respect to Sj.
The equations in (1) are first-order conditions for non-polluting inputs. Assuming an 
interior solution, we have f,J/ fhk = r./rh for all h, i, j, and k. The ratio of the marginal products
are equal to the ratio of the marginal costs of the inputs across farmers and non-polluting 
inputs. Equations in (2) and (4) relate to nitrogen fertilizer. Equations in (2) are similar to 
those in (1), but contain an additional term (1), pzsj > 0, the marginal cost of increasing nitrate 
level through fertilizer application. The necessary condition for fertilizer is
fSJ / f;J = (rs + fJ.zsJ) / r . To equate the ratio of marginal products to this "price" ratio requires that
the marginal product of fertilizer be greater than what it would be if it were a conventional 
input implying less fertilizer application. If the nitrate standard is made more stringent, i.e. z* 
is decreased, and this results in a higher marginal cost of meeting the standard (p increases), 
then, ceteris paribus, nitrogen fertilizer use will decrease further. Equations in (3) ensure that 
at least yj* is produced.
With this solution as a base of comparison, one can examine the change in resource 
allocation under different nitrate reducing policies in order to determine which, if any, can 
achieve the same cost-minimizing resource allocation. That is, given a specific policy, if the 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions to farmer j ’s problem are consistent with the Kuhn-Tucker conditions 
to the policy maker’s problem, then the policy can also be used to achieve the resource 
allocation at minimum cost. To explain, suppose the Kuhn-Tucker conditions to farmer j ’s 
problem are a subset of those for the policy maker. If solutions to both problems exist and are 
unique, they lead to the same input, output, and leachate levels used by farmer j . If the Kuhn- 
Tucker conditions for farmer j are not a subset of those for the policy maker, the policy will 
not meet the nitrate standard using the cost-minimizing resource allocation.
Taxing Nitrate Leachate. For this policy farmers pay a fixed tax of tz per unit of nitrate 
leachate. From production theory (Varian, 1992), farmer j has a conditional demand for 
nitrogen fertilizer, Sj (r, tz, y^), where r represents the vector of input prices. Nitrate leachate
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SzH SjJvp < z ‘
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(4) z * - £ z j( sj;vj) ^ 0’
j=i
where is the shadow price of increasing output for firm j, p is the marginal cost of making 
the nitrate standard more stringent, f,J is the partial derivative of fj with respect to x ,^ fsj is the 
partial derivative of f J with respect to sj5 and z} is the derivative of zJ with respect to Sj.
The equations in (1) are first-order conditions for non-polluting inputs. Assuming an 
interior solution, we havefjj/fhk = rVrh for all h, i, j, and k. The ratio of the marginal products
are equal to the ratio of the marginal costs of the inputs across farmers and non-polluting 
inputs. Equations in (2) and (4) relate to nitrogen fertilizer. Equations in (2) are similar to 
those in (1), but contain an additional term (1), pzsj > 0, the marginal cost of increasing nitrate 
level through fertilizer application. The necessary condition for fertilizer is
fs'/fiJ = (r +pzsJ) / r .  To equate the ratio of marginal products to this "price" ratio requires that
the marginal product of fertilizer be greater than what it would be if it were a conventional 
input implying less fertilizer application. If the nitrate standard is made more stringent, i.e. z 
is decreased, and this results in a higher marginal cost of meeting the standard (p increases), 
then, ceteris paribus, nitrogen fertilizer use will decrease further. Equations in (3) ensure that 
at least yj* is produced.
With this solution as a base of comparison, one can examine the change in resource 
allocation under different nitrate reducing policies in order to determine which, if any, can 
achieve the same cost-minimizing resource allocation. That is, given a specific policy, if the 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions to farmer j ’s problem are consistent with the Kuhn-Tucker conditions 
to the policy maker’s problem, then the policy can also be used to achieve the resource 
allocation at minimum cost. To explain, suppose the Kuhn-Tucker conditions to farmer j ’s 
problem are a subset of those for the policy maker. If solutions to both problems exist and are 
unique, they lead to the same input, output, and leachate levels used by farmer j. If the Kuhn- 
Tucker conditions for farmer j are not a subset of those for the policy maker, the policy will 
not meet the nitrate standard using the cost-minimizing resource allocation.
Taxing Nitrate Leachate. For this policy farmers pay a fixed tax of t, per unit of nitrate 
leachate. From production theory (Varian, 1992), farmer j has a conditional demand for 
nitrogen fertilizer, Sj (r, tz, y^), where r represents the vector of input prices. Nitrate leachate
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for farmer j is z j (Sj (r, tz, yj‘); Vj). The tax is set so that z j(s.(r,tz,yj*);vj) < z* and the
j=i
farmer’s problem is:
m
min c. = t zj(s.:v.)+r s. + y  r.x..j z v y  y  s j i y
i=l
subject to
fj(xlj»-»xmj,sj ;Vj) > yj*
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for this problem are the equations in (1), (3), and
(5) A..fsj - r  - t  z\ < 0 ,  s > 0, s.(A..fsj - r  - t  z j) = 0
If the leachate tax, tz, is set at p from the poicy maker’s problem, equations (5) are the same 
as in (2), and the first-order conditions to farmer j ’s problem are a subset of those for the 
policy maker’s problem. Thus, a tax on leachate implies the same leachate level with the same 
minimum-cost resource allocation.
Taxing Nitrogen Fertilizer. For a tax on nitrogen fertilizer, the tax, ts, is set such that
n
Y  z j(s.(r,ts,yj‘);v.) < z *, and farmer j ’s problem is:
j=i
m
min c. = (1 +t )r s. + y  r.x..j v s 7 s j i ij
i = l
subject to
fj(x ,j,—,xmjjSjjVj) > y / .
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for this problem are the equations in (1), (3), and
(6) XTsj - ( l  +ts)rs < 0 ,  Sj > 0, Sj(X,f,J- ( l  +ts)rs) = 0.
For the Kuhn-Tucker conditions from the n farmers’ problems to be consistent with those of 
the policy maker’s problem, it is necessary for tsrs from the farmers’ problems to be equal to 
pzsJ from the policy maker’s problem. If this is true, equations in (6) will be identical to those 
in (2). In general, the solutions to the farmers’ problems will differ from the policy maker’s 
because tsrs is constant, (e.g., the tax rate and price of nitrogen fertilizer are the same for all 
farmers. However, pzsJ will vary by farm. Only if the marginal product of nitrate leachate 
with respect to nitrogen fertilizer is equal across farms, zs' = ... = zsn, is it possible for the 
nitrogen fertilizer tax to achieve the nitrate standard at minimum cost. This is unlikely since
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soil characteristics, precipitation, and technology can vary dramatically within a region. Those 
exogenous factors, vj5 explicitly affect leaching and probably affect the marginal leachability 
of the soil with respect to nitrogen fertilizer use. Ceteris paribus, one would expect if farmer 
i has more leachable soils than farmer j, then marginal leachate of farmer i should be greater 
than the marginal leachate of farmer j, i.e. Zj1 > zsJ.
Since this policy leads to a different resource allocation than the minimum regional cost 
allocation, it would be useful to know how production plans differ. Assuming interior 
solutions, the marginal productivity of fertilizer from the policy maker’s solution is
fsJ = (rs + pzsJ)/k. and from farmer j ’s solution is fsJ = (rs+rsts)/A,j . Farmer j ’s solution differs
from the policy maker’s solution when tsrs < pzsJ or tsrs > pzsJ. One could speculate that the 
case where tsrs < pzsJ is more likely on more leachable soils where the increase in leachate 
given an incremental increase in nitrogen fertilizer, zsj, is relatively large. Conversely, the case 
where tsrs > pzsj is probably more likely on less leachable soils. If tsrs < pzsJ and f j is 
increasing and concave in s, then farmer j uses more nitrogen fertilizer than that identified in 
the planner’s problem, provided that the shadow price on output is the same between the two 
problems. Thus, the tax on fertilizer leads to higher nitrate leachate produced by the farmer 
with relatively leachable soils. If tsrs > p.zsJ, farmer j uses less nitrogen fertilizer, and leachate 
is lower than that for the policy maker’s problem.
Uniform Quantity Restrictions on Nitrate Leachate. Suppose there is a uniform quantity
restriction on nitrate leachate, z, on each firm. Here, z must be set such that nz < z \  and 
farmer j ’s problem becomes:
m
min c. = r s. + V  r.x..j s j 1 Ij
i = l
subject to
fj( V - > xmj>sj ;vj) ^ y / 
z j(Sj;v.) < z
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for this problem are the equations in (1), (3), and
(7) ^ jfs -rs-MjZsJ < 0, s. > 0, s ^ f ^ - r , - ^ )  = 0
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where pj is the marginal cost (shadow price) of increasing farmer j ’s leachate restriction. 
Intuitively, this policy is inconsistent with the planner’s problem because the restriction is on 
leachate levels for individual farmers rather than for total leachate within a region. Also the 
policy does not allow for differences in leachability across farms as the planner’s problem 
does. Equations in (7) are inconsistent with those in (2) because there is no reason for pj = 
p. For pj > p, the uniform leachate restriction results in less nitrogen fertilizer applied and less 
leaching for farmer j than does the regional cost-minimizing problem. For p, the leachate 
restriction increases nitrogen fertilizer applied and the leaching by farmer j.
To understand the full implications of this policy, one would like to be able to establish 
whether or not more leachable soils result in pj > p or pj < p. To establish the relationship 
between the leachability of the soil and pJ5 recall that the shadow price on the uniform leachate 
restriction, pj5 is the marginal change in farmer j ’s cost given a marginal change in the upper
bound on leachate, z . One might expect a more leachable soil to have a greater shadow price 
on leachate because as the leachate constraint is relaxed by a small amount, the allowable 
increase in production may be smaller than on less leachable soils. This leads to a relatively 
small increase in farm costs, implying pj < p, and causes fertilizer and leaching to rise for 
farmer j under the uniform leachate restriction compared with policy maker’s problem. 
Conversely, if a soil is less leachable, then one might expect pj > p, resulting in less fertilizer 
and leaching for farmer j under the uniform leachate restriction. Since it is both the 
leachability and productivity of the soil that determine the relationship between pj and p 
because pj and p relate marginal changes in leachate to marginal changes in costs, it is difficult 
to know for which farms these relationships hold. It is clearly an empirical question.
Uniform Quantity Restrictions on Nitrogen Fertilizer Application. The government could also 
place a uniform quantity restriction on the amount of nitrogen fertilizer that a farmer can apply.
n
The limit, s \  on Sj is such that £ z j0 j ’vj) ^ z*-. The problem for farmer j is:
m j = l
min c. = r s. + V 1 r x.
j  S j  / - >  1 l j
i=l
subject to
f ^ j ’- ’Xnj’SjiVj) > y /
Sj < s *
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for this problem are the equations in (1), (3), and
where is the shadow price for the restriction on nitrogen fertilizer applied by fanner j. 
Equations in (2) and (9), are inconsistent unless <)>j = pzsj, which is likely only if exogenous 
factors, Vj, are identical across farms. If > pzsJ, where fizsJ comes from the policy maker’s 
problem, then less fertilizer is applied by farmer j under the fertilizer restriction than under the 
policy maker’s regional cost minimizing problem. Conversely, if <j)j < pzsJ, then farmer j uses 
less nitrogen fertilizer, resulting in less leachate than that under the regional minimum-cost 
allocation.
One cannot easily determine the linkage between the leachability of the soil and whether 
<j)j > pzsJ or <j)j < pzsj. <j)j and pzsj are the marginal costs associated with an incremental increase 
in fertilizer use from the farmer’s problem here and the policy maker’s problem, respectively. 
For <j)j, this is easy to see because <j>j is the shadow price of the fertilizer restriction. For \izj, 
recall that p is the marginal cost associated with incrementally increasing leachate and that z.J 
is the marginal increase in leachate given an incremental increase in fertilizer application. 
These two pieces together give the marginal cost associated with increasing fertilizer use in the 
policy maker’s problem. Unfortunately, there is no general relationship between the 
leachability of a soil and the marginal cost associated with increasing fertilizer application.
Leachate Permits Sold at a Fixed Price. Another instrument to reduce regional nitrate leachate 
is the effluent permit. By assuming farmers are required to purchase leachate permits at a 
fixed price, pz, this policy is equivalent to taxing every unit of pollution. If pz = tz farmer j ’s 
problem is identical to farmer j ’s problem under the leachate tax, and the policy can achieve 
the regional cost-minimizing production and resource allocation.
Tradable Leachate Permits. An alternative form of leachate permit, similar to the one 
implemented for S02 emissions in the United States (Kete, 1992), is that in which a regulatory 
agency allocates an initial distribution of leachate permits, (z1*,.--, zn*), among the farmers, who 
can then trade permits among themselves. The initial distribution of permits must be set such
n
that 5Z zj * < z * . Assuming that the permit market is perfectly competitive and is in
j=i
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equilibrium at pz,5 farmer j ’s problem is:
m
min c. = p rz j(s.;v.)-zJ*l +r s.+Y ' r.x.
J  *  Z L v j ’  J y  J  s j  /  -> 1 1J
i = l
subject to
fj(Xij,...,xmj,sj;Vj) > y*
where zJ - zj* > 0 indicates zJ - z1* permits are purchased by farmer j and z* - zJ* < 0 indicates 
that zJ* - zJ permits are sold by farmer j. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are identical to those 
of the previous permit scheme and the leachate tax, again indicating the consistency of this 
policy instrument with the regional cost-minimizing allocation.
Summary
In summary, the analysis shows that effluent taxes, effluent permits sold at fixed prices, 
and tradable effluent permits that are initially allocated by a regulatory agency are all capable 
of achieving the policy maker’s minimum-cost resource allocation. Uniform quantity 
restrictions on fertilizer or leachate and taxing fertilizer do not.
Although ignored here, the administrative costs and problems with enforceability of 
various policies should be considered as well. With the exception of the tax on the polluting 
input, effective enforcement of the policies requires a constant monitoring effort, either of the 
effluent or the effluent-producing input. This monitoring is extremely difficult because of the 
non-point source nature of the problem. Under the tax on the polluting input, no such 
monitoring is needed, which makes this regulatory option more attractive to policy makers, 
despite the fact it does not result in the cost-minimizing resource allocation.
It is also important to remember that the actual costs of the different polices to 
individual farmers and farmers as a whole within the region can differ even if they achieve the 
same resource allocation as the policy maker’s problem. For example, both effluent permit 
schemes, lead to the same amount of output using the same set of inputs, but the regional farm 
costs for producing the output are greater when the government sells permits at a fixed price
5 If this assumption is not made and farmer j has significant market power and influence 
on the permit price, then farmer j may be able to realize excess revenues from the permit 
market. For instance, he may emerge as a price leader, creating a market similar to the 
Stackelberg model of duopoly (Gibbons, 1992).
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rather than initially allocating tradable permits. Thus, permits sold at a fixed price generate 
public revenues, but the tradable permits initially allocated freely to farmers do not.
To begin to shed some light on the relative magnitude of these costs and financial 
transfers, the next section is devoted to constructing a framework for determining the net farm 
revenues associated with different levels of nitrate leachate. This framework is used to 
empirically assess the differences in farm costs and public revenues associated with restricting 
nitrate leachate using different policy instruments.
THE BIOECONOMIC MODELS
Although the basis of comparison in the stylized analysis above is a social planner’s 
problem with regional leachate constraints, the primary building blocks of this model are the 
production models for individual farms. Here, the bioeconomic models of agricultural 
production and nitrate leachate needed for the empirical evaluation of regulatory policies are 
formulated. Separate models for agricultural production with chance constraints on nitrate 
leachate are formulated for the Corn Belt and Northeast.
Overview
The dynamic, bioeconomic models are much more realistic than the stylized framework 
above; but despite advances in solution methods, they must still include a great deal of 
abstraction. They must include only the most essential features of the agricultural production 
and nitrate leaching processes, such as the major decision alternatives and land resource 
differences. They focus only on the predominant field crops in each region for which nitrogen 
leaching may be a problem and on the crops normally grown in rotation with them.
The model of the Corn Belt, for example, obviously contains corn and soybeans. In 
Iowa, a typical Corn Belt state, corn and soybeans are grown on 75% of the cropland 
(Agricultural Statistics, 1992). Because of the large corn acreages and the high rates of 
nitrogen fertilizer application on com, there is the potential for significant nitrogen leaching 
across much of the state (Kellog et ah, 1992).
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In the Northeast, where agriculture is dominated by dairy,6 crop production is generally 
more diverse than in the Corn Belt, but com and alfalfa are commonly grown in rotation in 
support of the dairy operations. Com (for both silage and grain) and alfalfa are grown on 
about 40% of the cropland in New York (Agricultural Statistics, 1992). Although corn acreage 
is not as extensive as in the Midwest, there are some parts of the Northeast where the amount 
of nitrogen leached as a result of the fertilizer applied to corn may result in a substantial risk 
of nitrate contamination in groundwater (Kellog et al., 1992). Because of the predominance 
of dairy in the Northeast, the risk of nitrate contamination can be exacerbated through the 
application of manure to cropland as a supplement to the inorganic nitrogen fertilizer for corn 
production.
By including the two major field crops from each region in the models, the management 
responses to policies designed to limit nitrogen fertilizer are reflected both in the choice of crop 
rotation and nitrogen fertilizer application rates. The dynamics of the model account for the 
year-to-year carryover of nitrogen in the crop root zone. Precipitation, which affects both crop 
yields and the amount of nitrate leachate, is incorporated in the models as a random variable. 
Nitrogen leaching resulting from corn production is restricted using a chance constraint 
(Charnes and Cooper, 1959), which can be used to reduce the frequency of worst-case leaching 
scenarios by allowing leachate above a harmful level to occur with only a small probability. 
Because soil characteristics affect both productivity and leaching, a model accounts for 
production and leaching on only one soil. To evaluate regional impacts of nitrate reducing 
policies, models are formulated for several representative soils, and other soils in the regions 
are matched to these soils based on their productivity and leaching characteristics.
In these empirical models, nitrate leachate below the crop root zone on a farmer’s field 
is restricted rather than the actual nitrate concentration in an aquifer. This simplification is 
necessary because of the lack of information on the precise linkage between nitrate leachate 
below the crop root zone on an individual field and the actual nitrate concentration in an 
aquifer. This simplification also ignores the time lag between nitrates leaching below the root 
zone and actually entering the aquifer. By using a sufficiently long planning horizon and 
conducting a regional rather than site-specific analysis, the effects of this latter simplification 
on the policy analyses should be minimized.
6 In New York, dairy generates over 48% of the farm marketings (New York Agricultural 
Statistics, 1992-1993). Placing second are greenhouse and nursery products, with only 12% 
of farm marketings.
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A Bioeconomic Model o f "Com Belt" Agriculture
Consider a typical farmer in the Corn Belt growing com grain and soybeans in rotation 
on one acre of a specific soil. The corn produced (bu./acre), C = C(x,z), is assumed to depend 
on the nitrogen available in the crop root zone, x (lbs./acre), and precipitation, z (inches). The 
soybeans produced (bu./acre), S = S(z), are assumed to depend only on precipitation because 
this legume crop fixes its own nitrogen for uptake. The amount of nitrogen in the crop root 
zone available for corn production, x, depends on the amount of nitrogen applied, x,, (lbs./acre), 
nitrogen mineralized by the soil organic matter or accumulated through precipitation, Nm 
(lbs./acre), and nitrogen carried over from the previous year if corn was grown during the 
previous year or nitrogen fixed by soybeans if soybeans were grown during the previous year. 
Nitrogen carryover is some fraction, y„ of nitrogen in the crop root zone that is neither uptaken 
by the plant, nor denitrified, nor leached. Nitrogen uptaken by the plant is given by y2x. 
Nitrogen that is denitrified is y3 xa, and nitrogen leached is L (lbs./acre). Leachate, L, is some 
proportion, g(z) where 0 < g(z) < 1, of the nitrogen that is neither uptaken nor denitrified. The 
proportion leached, g(z), depends explicitly on precipitation.
Assuming that the discounted value of expected net farm revenue from producing com 
and soybeans is maximized, the problem is:
T b
max
a
subject to
(11) XM = x , > N mtN(
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(16) Ll t = g(zt)[( l -y2)x ,, -y3x “t]
(17) L2,t = g(zt)[(l -y2)x2,t _Y3x2at]
(18) Prob[5ltLlt+ 52tL2t > L J  < a
(19) x at, x2at, 8lt, 82t, 831 > 0
(20) x10, x,a0, x20, x2a0, 810, 820, 83q known
where p = 1/(1+8) is the discount factor for a discount rate, 8; pct is the net revenue per bushel 
of corn in year t, net of all costs except nitrogen fertilizer; rt is the price of nitrogen fertilizer 
per pound; subscript "1" on the decision variables refers to activities on land producing com 
following soybeans; subscript "2" refers to activities on land producing com following corn; 
the subscript "3" refers to activities on land producing soybeans; 81>t is the fraction of the acre 
producing corn in year t following soybeans in t-1; 82 t is the fraction of the acre producing 
corn in year t following corn in t-1; 83 t is the fraction of the acre producing soybeans in year 
t; and fZt(Zj) is the probability density function for precipitation.
The objective is to maximize the discounted value of expected net farm revenue over 
time for three production activities: corn following soybeans, com following com, and
soybeans. Expectations are taken because of the stochastic precipitation component. Land 
variables are needed for each of the three production activities because of the differences in 
the amounts of nitrogen in the crop root zone carried over from the previous years. Other than 
the land variables, decision variables include the amount of nitrogen fertilizer applied on com 
following soybeans and corn following corn.
Equations (11) and (12) are state equations for the amount of nitrogen available in the 
crop root zone on corn following soybeans and corn following com, respectively. Equations 
(13) through (15) are natural restrictions on land. Land producing corn following soybeans is 
land that produced soybeans the previous year, equation (13). Land producing corn following 
com cannot be land that produced soybeans in the previous year, equation (14). Total land 
activities cannot exceed the land available, equation (15). Nitrogen leached below the crop 
root zone, identified in equations (16) and (17), is restricted using a probabilistic chance
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constraint, equation (18), where leaching above a harmful bound, Lu, can occur with only a 
small probability. Equations (19) and (20) are the non-negativity restrictions on the decision 
variables and the initial conditions for the decision and state variables, respectively.
To obtain some idea of how this model behaves, Thomas (1994) examined the necessary 
conditions for optimization by specifying a certainty-equivalent form using expected 
precipitation in both the corn production function and the constraint on nitrate leachate. 
Because of the number of necessary conditions and their complexity, obtaining an exact 
interpretation of each is difficult, and these detailed results are not repeated here. However, 
by making a few key assumptions, the effects of the leachate constraint on the optimal amount 
of nitrogen in the crop root zone and nitrogen fertilizer applied could be determined. The 
addition of the leachate constraint increases the marginal cost of increasing nitrogen in the root 
zone. Thus, ceteris paribus, the amount of nitrogen in the crop root zone on corn following 
soybeans decreases as a result of the constraint on leachate. Because of the positive 
relationship between nitrogen fertilizer applied and the amount of nitrogen in the crop root 
zone from equation (11), one would expect nitrogen fertilizer application to decrease.
It is also important to determine the effect of the leaching constraint on the crop 
rotation, but establishing this relationship is not as straightforward as it is for the relationship 
between the leaching constraint and the nitrogen variables. Without solving the first-order 
conditions as a whole, one may obtain counter-intuitive results. These can only be explained 
away through the empirical solutions to the bioeconomic models below.
A Bioeconomic Model o f Agriculture in the Northeast
Now consider a typical farmer in the Northeast growing corn silage and alfalfa in 
rotation. The bioeconomic model for this situation is similar to that for corn and soybeans 
grown in rotation, but there are some important differences, as well. Corn silage produced 
(t./acre), C = C(x,z), is assumed to depend on the amount of nitrogen available in the crop root 
zone and precipitation. Because of the relatively large number of dairies in the Northeast, 
applied nitrogen comes from two sources: nitrogen fertilizer, xfa, and manure, xma. Alfalfa 
produced (t./acre), a = a(z), depends only on precipitation because alfalfa, like soybeans, is a 
legume crop that fixes its own nitrogen for uptake. Factors affecting the amount of nitrogen 
in the crop root zone are similar to those for corn and soybeans grown in rotation.
One important difference between this model and the model for the Com Belt is the fact 
that alfalfa is a perennial crop. Once planted, alfalfa typically remains in rotation for three
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years in New York (personal communication with Ed McClenahan, manager of Cornell 
University’s Caldwell experiment station). Therefore, three separate land activities are needed 
for alfalfa, one for each year in the rotation. In addition, alfalfa yields are lower for alfalfa in 
the first year of rotation while the crop is being established. To accomodate these differences 
in yields, two production functions are specified for alfalfa production, a, = a,(z) for first year 
alfalfa and a2 = a^z) for second- and third-year alfalfa.
max
Mathematically, the bioeconomic model is:
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where 5, t is the fraction of the acre producing com in year t following alfalfa in t-1; S2t is the 
fraction of the acre producing corn in year t following corn in t-1; 53t is the fraction of the acre 
producing first-year alfalfa; 541 is the fraction of the acre producing second-year alfalfa; 85>t is
the fraction of the acre producing third-year alfalfa; and xm is an upper bound on the rate at 
which manure can be applied, since rarely is an unlimited supply of manure available.
The objective function maximizes the expected discounted value of net farm revenue 
over time for five production activities: com following alfalfa, denoted with subscript "1"; 
corn following corn, denoted with subscript "2"; first year alfalfa, denoted with subscript "3"; 
second year alfalfa, denoted with subscript "4", and third year alfalfa, denoted with subscript 
"5". Other than the land variables, decision variables in the model include the amounts of 
nitrogen fertilizer and manure applied on both corn following alfalfa and corn following corn. 
Again, expectations are taken because of the stochastic precipitation component.
Equations (21) and (22) are the state equations for the amount of nitrogen in the crop 
root zone on corn following alfalfa and corn following corn, respectively. Differences between 
these equations and those in (11) and (12) from the Corn Belt model are the addition of 
manure as both a source of nitrogen and a source of denitrification. Manure denitrifies at a 
rate approximately twice that of inorganic fertilizer (Meisinger and Randall, 1991).
Equations (23) through (27) are restrictions on the land activities. Land producing corn 
following alfalfa must be land that produced third-year alfalfa in the previous year, equation 
(23). Land producing com following corn must be land that produced corn in the previous 
year, equation (24). Land producing second-year alfalfa must be land that produced first-year 
alfalfa in the previous year, equation (25). Land producing third year alfalfa must be land that 
produced second-year alfalfa in the previous year, equation (26). Total land activities cannot 
exceed the land available, equation (27).
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The remaining equations are restrictions on the amount of manure that can be applied, 
equations (28) and (29); leachate restrictions, equations (30) and (31); non-negativity 
restrictions, equation (32); and initial conditions, (33). Nitrate leachate below the crop root 
zone is restricted using a probabilistic chance constraint, the same approach as used in the Com 
Belt model, in order to protect against worst-case leaching scenarios.
By examining the necessary conditions for a certainty-equivalent form of this model, 
arguments nearly identical to those made with the Corn Belt model can be used to establish 
that imposing the leachate constraint results in less nitrogen in the crop root zone and less 
nitrogen fertilizer and manure applied on both com following corn and com following alfalfa. 
Again, however, no straightforward, intuitively-correct relationship between the crop rotation 
and leachate constraint can be easily established.
ESTIMATING THE COMPONENTS OF THE BIOECONOMIC MODELS
Now that the bioeconomic models are specified, we must identify the study regions and 
identify the various prices and parameters needed to apply the bioeconomic models empirically. 
The corn and legume response functions are estimated, as are the nitrate leaching equations, 
the precipitation distributions, and the final form of the chance constraint on nitrate leachate.
The Study Regions
The areas in the Com Belt and Northeast chosen for the policy analyses, Boone County 
in Iowa and a two-county area in New York, Genesee and Wyoming Counties, are 
representative of major agricultural regions in the two states. Boone County, located in central 
Iowa, is part of the glacial till region of central and northeastern Iowa. Genesee and Wyoming 
Counties are located in the glacial till and outwash region of the western plain in New York.
Agriculture in the two regions is quite different. There are just over a thousand farms 
in Boone County, 93% of which are crop farms. Three-quarters of them are commercial farms, 
defined here as a farm with gross sales over $10,000. There are just under 1,500 farms in 
Genesee and Wyoming Counties, where dairy is a dominant agricultural activity; 42% are dairy 
farms; the average herd size is 86 cows. About 62% of the farms are commercial farms. 
There are about 315 acres of cropland per farm in the Iowa region, compared with 218 acres 
per farm in the New York region (1987 Census o f Agriculture).
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As in many parts of the Corn Belt, agriculture in Boone County is dominated by corn 
and soybeans. These crops are grown on over 95% of the cropland acreage (1987 Census o f 
Agriculture). About 90% of land in farms is cropland. Agriculture in Genesee and Wyoming 
Counties is less homogenous. Approximately 76% of the farmland is cropland, and corn and 
alfalfa are the two most important crops (New York Agricultural Statistics, 1992-1993), 
accounting for over half of the total cropland harvested (1987 Census o f Agriculture). About 
half of the corn is for silage. Since about 42% of the farms are dairy farms, much of the crop 
production is for feed (1987 Census o f Agriculture).
Soils in the two regions also differ. Many soils in Boone County are loam or clay loam 
(Soil Survey o f Boone County, Iowa). Silt loam soils and gravelly silt loams are common in 
Genesee and Wyoming Counties (Soil Survey o f Genesee County, New York and Soil Survey 
o f Wyoming County, New York). In Boone County, over 75% of the cropland capable of 
growing corn is from hydrologic group B.7 Soils are much more diverse in New York. Of 
the cropland suitable for corn in Genesee and Wyoming Counties, about 10% are from 
hydrologic group A, 39% are from hydrologic group B, and 51% are from hydrologic group 
C (National Resources Inventory, 1982; SCS Soils-5).
Because of the differential productivity and leachability among soils, the bioeconomic 
models are formulated for several soils. Five soils are used to represent the diversity of soils 
in the Iowa region, and seven soils reflect the diversity of the New York region (Table 1). The 
specific soils are chosen because of the availability of crop yield response data on each soil and 
their ranges of leaching and productivity (Table l)8. These soils should capture major 
differences in leaching among soils (Knisel, 1993). Four of the five base soils in the Iowa 
region are hydrologic group B. Soil I-C is somewhat heavier, resembling many soils in
7 The hydrologic group, which reflects the capacity of a soil to permit infiltration (Smith 
and Cassel, 1991), reflects both its leachability and productivity (Knisel, 1993). Hydrologic 
groups are A, B, C, and D, with group A soils allowing the most infiltration and group D soils 
allowing the least. In general, soils in group A and B tend to leach more than group C and 
D soils, but group A and B soils are usually more productive (Knisel, 1993). Also, corn 
generally is not grown on hydrologic group D soils in either region (Soil Survey of Boone 
County, Iowa; Soil Survey of Genesee County, New York; Soil Survey of Wyoming County, 
New York).
8 These characteristics can be found in SCS Soils-5 data.
Table 1. General Characteristics of the Base Soils in the Iowa and New York Regions
Average
Organic
Base
Soil
Soil
Name
USDA
Texture Class
Hydrologic
Group
Matter
(%)
Average
Slope
Drainage
Classification
Iowa Region
I-A Tama Silty Clay Loam B 3.5 3 Well Drained
I-B Clarion Loam B 4.0 3 Well Drained
I-C Canisteo Clay Loam B/D 6.0 1 Poorly Drained
I-D Nicollet Loam B 6.0 2 Moderately Well Drained
I-E Dinsdale Silty Clay Loam B 4.0 3 Well Drained
New York Region
N-A Chenango Gravelly Loam A 4.0 3 Well Drained
N-B Tunkhannock Gravelly Silt Loam A 3.0 5 Well Drained
N-C Lima Silt Loam B 4.0 3 Moderately Well Drained
N-D Unadilla Silt Loam B 4.5 9 Well Drained
N-E Collamer Silt Loam C 3.5 4 Moderately Well Drained
N-F Minoa Very Fine Sandy Loam C 4.5 0 Somewhat Poorly Drained
N-G Bath Channery Silt Loam C 4.5 5 Well Drained
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hydrologic group B but also some soils in group D.9 In the New York region, two base soils 
are from hydrologic group A, two from group B, and three from group C.
Slope, drainage, and organic matter affect a soil’s productivity and leachability (Shaffer 
et al., 1991). As the slope increases, one expects more nitrogen runoff and less leaching; but 
the effects of slope are probably minor because nearly all the soils are relatively flat. Drainage 
does vary among the 12 base soils; it is related both to slope and hydrologic group (Table 1). 
A soil’s organic matter affects productivity and nitrate leachate because organic matter is itself 
a source of nitrogen (Knox and Moody, 1991). The soils in the Iowa region have slightly 
higher organic matter content than those in the New York region (Table 1).
To compare nitrate reducing policies, soils suitable for corn and legume rotation within 
a region are matched to one of the base soils. Soils are grouped according to characteristics 
that most affect productivity and nitrate leaching. Data to allocate soils to the base groups are 
from the 1982 National Resource Inventory data.10 Soil characteristics for individual soils are 
found using SCS Soils-5 data and county soil surveys. The procedures used to group the soils 
are in Table 2, as are the distributions of acreages for the empirical analysis. The most 
prominent soil in the Iowa region is I-B (47%), with between 20 and 25% in the other two 
major groups, I-D and I-C, respectively. In New York, soils N-D and N-F are the most 
prominent, with about 30% in each group.
Following Crutchfield et al. (1992), who classify nitrate leaching potential of soils using 
annual precipitation and hydrologic group, the primary sort on soils within regions in this study 
is by hydrologic group.11 This classification should capture the major differences in soils, but 
other characteristics are used to classify soils, as well. In New York, soils are sorted by 
organic matter content because drainage and slope are highly related to hydrologic group. 
However, drainage is used to distinguish further between soils matched to N-F and N-G base 
groups because both these soils are in hydrologic group C soils with an average organic matter 
of 4%. In Iowa, since only one base soil (I-C) is not in hydrologic group B, and this soil is
9 No hydrologic group A soils are chosen because no yield response data were available 
for a hydrologic group A soil.
10 National Resource Inventory data from 1982 rather than 1987 were used because 1987 
data contained fewer sampling points, making county estimates of cropland acreages for 
individual soils less accurate.
11 Annual precipitation is assumed to be the same on the different soils within a region and, 
as such, cannot be used to differentiate leaching potential.
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heavier, all soils in Boone County that are not in hydrologic groups A or B are matched with 
I-C soil. Average corn yields from the county soil survey area are used to match soils to the 
remaining four base soils (Table 2).12
Prices and Production Costs
Estimates of the yearly costs and returns for growing corn and the legume crops are also 
an important part of the empirical analysis. Prices are assumed constant over time.
Table 2. Classification of Soils into the Base Soil Groups by Region
Base
Soil
Classification Cropland in Studv Reeions
Hydrologic
Group
Organic
Matter
(%)
Drainage Class0
Average Com 
Yield 
(bu./acre)
Percentb Acres0
New York
N-A A > 4 All 3.9 5,106
N-B A < 4 All 5.8 7,594
N-C B < 4 All 7.4 9,689
N-D B > 4 All 31.9 41,768
N-E C < 4 All 4.7 6,154
N-F C > 4 Not WD or 28.0 36,661
MWD
N-G C > 4 WD or MWD 18.3 23,961
Iowa
I-A A or B < 80 4.2 9,949
I-B A or B 95 to < 110 47.2 111,811
I-C not A nor B All 24.7 58,511
I-D A or B > 110 19.3 45,719
I-E A or B 80 to < 95 4.5 10,660
0 WD denotes Well Drained and MWD denotes Moderately Well Drained soils.
b Percentages are calculated using cropland acreages from the 1982 National Resource Inventory data.
c Based on 236,000 acres of com and soybean harvested in Iowa and 130,933 acres of com and alfalfa 
acres harvested in New York (1987 Census of Agriculture). Detail may not add due to rounding.
12 Of soils I-A, I-B, I-D, and I-E, soil I-D is the most productive, followed by I-B, I-E, and 
then I-A. These differences in soil productivity are demonstrated in the next section by the 
differences in the intercept dummy variables for the soils in the estimated com response 
relationship.
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For the Iowa models, 1991 prices are obtained from Agricultural Prices, 1991 Summary. 
The prices of com grain and soybeans are $2.35/bu. and $5.55/bu, respectively. The inorganic 
nitrogen fertilizer cost of SO. 1305/lb. is based on $214/ton anhydrous ammonia, which contains 
82% nitrogen (Meisinger and Randall, 1991). Variable costs per acre excluding the cost for 
nitrogen fertilizer are $135.54 and $102.56 for corn and soybeans, respectively. These costs 
are from the comprehensive USDA production budgets constructed for 1985 and are available 
for Iowa in Iowa Agricultural Statistics, 1987. The variable cost of seed and chemicals in the 
USDA production budgets for soybeans, $31.78/acre, however did seem low; it is increased 
to $74.15/acre, reflecting estimates from Iowa Agricultural Statistics, 1990.13 Based on these 
estimates and a com yield of 135 bu./acre, the net revenue for com grain, net of all variable 
costs except nitrogen fertilizer, is $1.49/bu.
Most prices in the New York models are 1991 prices from New York Agricultural 
Statistics, 1992-93, but some information for the New York models is slightly more difficult 
to obtain than that for the Iowa models. For instance, many dairy farmers produce their own 
com silage for feed, and the price reported in New York Agricultural Statistics, 1992-93 is 
based on a "thin" market and may not accurately reflect the cost of corn silage for most 
farmers. Also, little is known about the average variable cost of spreading manure as a source 
of nitrogen.
To resolve these difficulties, a corn grain equivalent price, reflecting its opportunity 
cost, is used as the price for corn silage. Using the 1991 New York average com grain 
yield/acre of 98 bu., the com grain price of $2.70/bu., and the corn silage yield/acre of 14 
tons/acre, the New York corn grain equivalent price for silage is $18.90/ton. This is lower 
than the reported corn silage price of $23.80/ton. Inorganic nitrogen fertilizer costs are 
$0.27/lb., based on $243/ton urea and a concentration of 900 lbs. of nitrogen per ton of urea.
Variable costs per acre for com silage, first-year alfalfa, and established alfalfa of 
$191.39, $252.13, and $188.36, respectively, are from the 1990 the Pennsylvania State 
University production budgets reported in Greaser (1991). Assuming that corn silage 
production is 18 tons/acre, the variable net revenue for corn silage, net of all costs except 
nitrogen fertilizer, $9.92/ton. The cost of applying a pound of nitrogen from manure of $0.19 
is based on worksheets from Cornell’s Pro-Dairy program that assumes a cost of $2.20 per 
mile hauled, a round-trip travel distance of three miles, 10 tons of manure being hauled per 13
13 Production costs in Iowa Agricultural Statistics, 1990 were not used for the entire budget 
calculations because they do not distinguish between fixed and variable costs of production, 
whereas the USDA budgets do.
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load, and 3.5 lbs. of nitrogen per ton of manure.14 Finally, the price of alfalfa is $84.50/ton, 
the 1991 price from New York Agricultural Statistics, 1992-93.
Corn Yield Response to Nitrogen and Precipitation
Base-soil corn yields for grain in Iowa and silage in New York are estimated as a 
quadratic function (e.g., Hexem and Heady, 1978; Heady and Dillon, 1961) of nitrogen and 
water from data on yield, nitrogen available in the crop root zone (both from fertilizer and non­
fertilizer sources), and precipitation. Data are from several sources.
Iowa data for corn response to nitrogen fertilizer application on the five base soils are 
from agronomic experiments conducted by the Department of Agronomy, Iowa State University 
during 1986 and 1987 (McClenahan, 1987). The data set contains 629 observations. At an 
experimental site, data typically consist of six nitrogen fertilization rates, varying from zero to 
200 lbs./acre in 25 to 40 lb. increments, with four repetitions of each rate. The county 
locations of the experimental sites for the 1987 trials are assumed the same as for the 1986 
trials. New York data for corn silage response to nitrogen fertilization on the seven base soils 
are from agronomic experiments conducted from 1985 to 1991 by Klausner in the Department 
of Soil, Crop, and Atmospheric Sciences, Cornell University. The 276 observations include 
four repetitions of six fertilization rates ranging from zero to 225 lbs./acre.
Since the total amount of nitrogen in the crop root zone and precipitation were not 
collected for either data set, these data were collected differently. Precipitation data in 
New York for the nearest weather stations are from the Northeast Regional Climate Center, 
Cornell University. In Iowa, the only geographic information recorded is the county in which 
the 1986 experiments were conducted. Thus, Iowa precipitation data are regional Iowa data 
from the World Weather Disk. Monthly precipitation levels in 1986 and 1987 for the corn 
response functions are assigned by matching the county locations of the agronomic experiments 
with the regions defined by the World Weather Disk. Precipitation during the growing season 
(April-September) is used in the com yield response functions.
The remaining variable needed to estimate the corn production functions is the amount 
of nitrogen in the crop root zone. There has been little empirical research to determine the 
exact amount and movement of nitrogen in the crop root zone on specific soils. Researchers,
14 The variable cost of nitrogen from manure consists of the labor, fuel, and machinery 
costs of spreading which are affected by the distance and number of trips to the field, the 
nitrogen content of the manure, and the spreading rate (Pro-Dairy worksheet).
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however, have developed a number of nutrient simulation models (e.g. GLEAMS (Leonard et 
al., 1987), EPIC (Williams et al., 1984), NLEAP (Shaffer et al., 1991), CERES (Jones and 
Kiniry, 1986), LEACHN (Hutson and Wagenet, 1991), etc.) designed to trace the amount and 
movement of nitrogen in the crop root zone.
NLEAP (Nitrogen Leaching and Economic Analysis Package) is used here to find the 
amount of nitrogen in the crop root zone other than that from fertilizer. It is also used below 
to obtain data for estimating the nitrate leaching equations. NLEAP was selected primarily 
because it is designed to find monthly or annual site-specific estimates of nitrate leaching using 
basic soils and climate data readily available (Shaffer et al., 1991). Other nutrient simulation 
models typically require more detailed data and trace nitrate movement on either an hourly, 
daily, or monthly basis. This additional detail would be of little use in the bioeconomic 
models to trace annual nitrogen movement on specific soils.
The model was run on each of the 12 base soils using primarily the climate and soils 
databases developed specifically for NLEAP. Other data needed were found in Soil Survey o f 
Boone County, Iowa; Soil Survey o f Genesee County, New York; Soil Survey o f Wyoming 
County, New York, and Follett et al. (1991). NLEAP separately distinguishes the sources of 
nitrogen in the root zone, which include that from the soil’s organic matter and precipitation, 
as well as nitrogen fertilizer and residual nitrogen. These estimates of other sources of 
nitrogen are combined with the fertilization rates in the two experimental data sets to 
approximate the total nitrogen available in the crop root zone.
The estimated corn yield response functions to nitrogen available in the crop root zone 
and growing season precipitation are given in Table 3. In New York, separate production 
functions are estimated for the different hydrologic groups to account for differential 
productivity.15 Because all base soils but one in Iowa are from the same hydrologic group, 
the production function in Iowa contains only dummy variables to account for productivity 
differences.
15 Originally, the production function was estimated separately for group A soils, but the 
parameters for x, x2, and xz each had t-ratios less than two and the parameter for x was 
negative. Partially accounting for this is the fact that only 52 observations were available for 
the group A soils, as compared to 112 observations for both groups B and C. The production 
function for hydrologic group A is estimated using pooled data with intercept dummy variables 
accounting for differences between hydrologic groups.
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Table 3. Corn Yield Response to Nitrogen in the Crop Root Zone and Precipitation8
New York--Hydrologic Group Ab (n  = 2 7 6 ,  R2 = 0 . 5 0 )
C ( x , z ) = - 1 0 . 1 6  + 1 . 5 9  dA -  2 . 9 0  d B + 0 . 1 9 1 8  x  -  0 . 0 0 1 6  x 2
( 2 . 6 3 )  ( - 4 . 5 6 )  ( 7 . 5 6 )  ( - 5 . 4 1 )
- 0 . 2 2 2 4  z + 0 . 0 3 4 8  z 2 -  0 . 0 0 3 2  x z  
( - 0 . 3 8 )  ( 2 . 6 3 )  ( - 4 . 4 5 )
New York--Hydrologic Group B ( n  = 1 1 2 ,  R2 = 0 . 7 6 )
C ( x , z ) = 7 1 . 2 4  + 0 . 2 2 1 8  x  -  0 . 0 0 0 1 9  x 2 -  7 . 8 4 9 7  z + 0 . 1 9 8 8  z 2
( 7 . 3 2 )  ( - 5 . 3 2 )  ( - 5 . 2 5 )  ( 6 . 3 0 )
-  0 . 0 0 3 6  x z  
( - 3 . 6 0 )
New York--Hydrologic Group C ( n  = 1 1 2 ,  R2 = 0 . 6 1 )
C ( x , z ) = - 6 2 . 2 0  + 0 . 1 1 6 6  x  -  0 . 0 0 0 1 8  x 2 + 7 . 2 7 1 6  z -  0 . 2 1 6 5  z 2
( 3 . 7 6 )  ( - 4 . 5 3 )  ( 4 . 2 7 )  ( - 4 . 6 8 )
-  0 . 0 0 1 4  x z  
( 1 . 10 )
Iowac ( n  = 6 2 9 ,  R2 = 0 . 5 7 )
C ( x ,  z ) = - 4 9 0 . 3 9  -  3 6 . 8 0  d x + 1 1 . 6 3  d 2 -  2 . 5 9  d 3 + 3 3 . 0 0  d 4
( - 8 . 5 8 )  ( 3 . 1 8 )  ( 0 . 4 1 )  ( 4 . 2 7 )
+ 2 . 3 5  x  -  0 . 0 0 2 0 9  x 2 + 1 1 . 1 6  z + 0 . 0 2 0 4 1  z 2 -  0 . 0 2 4 6  x z  
( 9 . 4 7 )  ( - 7 . 3 3 )  ( 2 . 4 0 )  ( 0 . 2 2 )  ( - 6 . 0 4 )
8 C denotes com yield (tons of silage per acre in New York and bushels of grain per 
acre in Iowa). The amount of nitrogen in the crop root zone is x (lbs./acre), and April 
through September precipitation is z (inches).
b This function is used for hydrologic group A soils, but it is estimated using pooled 
data from all three hydrologic groups. To account for differences between groups, 
intercept dummy variables are used. The dummy variables for groups A and B are 
denoted by dA and dB, respectively; the intercept corresponds with group C soils.
c Intercept dummy variables for I-A, I-B, I-C, and I-D soils are denoted by d,, d2, d3, 
and d4. The intercept alone is that for I-E soil.
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Although the R2 values for the estimated production functions are somewhat low, nearly 
all of the signs on the parameters are as expected; the t-ratios are generally greater than two. 
In the Iowa function, the sign on the parameter for precipitation squared is unexpectedly 
positive, indicating corn yields increase at an increasing rather than a decreasing rate with 
precipitation. But the t-ratio for this parameter is low. The t-ratio for the dummy variable for 
I-C soil is low, as well, 0.22; but the soil dummy variables as a whole significantly affect corn 
yield (F = 53.23). In the estimated New York models for hydrologic groups A and B, the 
linear and squared precipitation parameters are also incorrectly signed if precipitation increases 
com yields at a decreasing rate. However, if one evaluates the marginal product of com with 
respect to precipitation at the means for the nitrogen and precipitation data, then the marginal 
products are positive, as one would expect.16
To obtain some idea of the behavior of these production functions, the elasticities of 
production with respect to nitrogen in the root zone are evaluated at the means of the nitrogen 
and precipitation data. These elasticities are 0.58, 0.53, and 0.43 for the hydrologic group A, 
B, and C functions in New York, respectively. In the estimated function for Iowa, the 
elasticity of production with respect to nitrogen is 0.96. In addition, optimal static fertilizer 
application rates and corn yields are determined.17 Results are in Table 4.
By way of comparison, the average fertilization rate in Iowa is 128 lbs./acre; average 
corn yield is 118 bu./acre (Iowa Agricultural Statistics, 1990). In New York, the average corn 
silage yield is 14 tons/acre (New York Agricultural Statistics, 1992-1993), and the fertilizer 
recommendation for continuous corn is 120 lbs./acre (1994 Cornell Recommends for Integrated 
Field Crop Management). Not surprisingly, estimates are larger than the state averages or 
recommendations because they are based on experimental data. Typically, experimental yields 
are thought to be greater than those on farms of better or more intensive management 
conditions; field and harvest losses are probably lower as well.
While these estimates can be explained, they may distort the results from the 
bioeconomic models, especially the larger yields, by inflating farm returns and providing
16 At the means for the nitrogen variable, the marginal products of com with respect to 
precipitation are positive for precipitation greater than 14.0 and 22.0 inches for the hydrologic 
group A and B functions, respectively. The mean precipitation levels for the group A and B 
functions are 19.6 and 24.2 inches, respectively.
17 Mathematically, this problem is: Max pc C(x,z*) - rxa, where x is equal to the fertilizer 
applied, xa, plus other nitrogen in the root zone, and z is average precipitation.
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Table 4. Optimal Fertilizer Application Rates and the Resulting Corn Yields in a 
Static Framework Using the Estimated Com Yield Response Functions
Soil
Nitrogen Applied 
(lbs./acre)
Corn Yield3 
(yield/acre)
Iowa
I-A 181 121
I-B 163 146
I-C 129 155
I-D 142 190
I-E 173 157
New York
N-A 211 25.1
N-B 217 25.1
N-C 157 20.6
N-D 141 20.6
N-E 172 25.2
N-F 153 25.2
N-G 199 25.2
a Bushels of corn grain on the Iowa soils and tons of corn silage on the New York 
soils.
inaccurate estimates of the effects of restricting nitrate leachate on different soils. Thus, in the 
objective functions of the bioeconomic models, the production functions are multiplied by 0.8 
and 0.9, respectively, to reflect 20% field and harvest losses in New York and 10% in Iowa,18 
the former accounting for greater transportation and storage losses for corn silage (Bolsen and 
Ilg, 1980). The high predicted nitrogen application rates are less worrisome than yields 
because its cost is such a small proportion of total production cost, and the relative effects on 
corn yields and leachate by soil probably remain valid.
Soybean and Alfalfa Yield Response to Precipitation
The bioeconomic models also require production functions for alfalfa and soybean 
response to precipitation for each soil. Unfortunately, soil-specific data for these crops are 
unavailable and the responses of alfalfa and soybeans to precipitation are assumed to be the 
same for all soils in the region. To obtain the expected legume response, we use county
18 Others have adjusted experimental yields or yields under best management practices 
(BMP) downward to depict actual farm yields. Knoblauch and Milligan (1981) decrease BMP 
com silage yields from SCS Form 5 information by 25 to 37%.
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average yields. The average soybean yield for 1979 through 1987 is 41.1 bu./acre (Iowa 
Agricultural Statistics). In Wyoming and Genesee Counties, only county average yields of all 
alfalfa stands are reported in New York Agricultural Statistics; separate yields for first-year and 
established alfalfa are not available. Also, 1992 county average yields ( 2.4 and 2.3 tons/acre, 
respectively) are considered low by farm managers because the data include lighter alfalfa 
mixes, such as alfalfa and orchard grass (Knoblauch and Milligan, 1994). To reflect these 
conditions, expected alfalfa yields are assumed to be 3 tons/acre and 4 tons/acre for first-year 
and established alfalfa, respectively. Both these yields are set at the lower end of the three to 
six tons/acre range in the Cornell Field Crops Handbook to reflect harvest and field losses.
Nitrogen Leaching
Another integral component of the bioeconomic model is the equation for leachate. 
Nitrogen leached below the crop root zone annually is given by: L = g(zI2)NAL, where g(z12) 
is between zero and unity and depends on 12-month precipitation, denoted z]2. NAL is the 
nitrogen in the crop root zone neither uptaken by the plant nor denitrified and, thus, available 
for leaching.19 We set g(z,2) = 1 - exp(-A.z12), which bounds it between zero and one and 
makes it increasing in precipitation. This cumulative exponential form is also similar to that 
of EPIC, another nitrate leaching simulation model (Williams et al., 1984).
To estimate this leaching equation we need data for L, NAL, and z12. Since actual data 
on leachate are unavailable for the base soils, data for L are simulated for a reasonable range 
of z12 and NAL also using NLEAP. These simulated data are used to estimate the parameter, 
X, of the equation for L. For each soil, 110 observations are generated by varying annual 
precipitation in two-inch increments from 24 to 44 inches for Iowa soils and 28 to 48 inches 
for the New York soils. These ranges bracket the two 30-year annual precipitation levels for 
central Iowa and the Portageville weather station in Wyoming County. Fertilizer application 
rates are varied from 20 to 200 lbs./acre in 20 lb. increments for each precipitation level.20
19 From before, NAL is equal to (l-y2)x - y3xa for the Iowa models. In the New York 
models, NAL differs slightly because both manure and inorganic nitrogen fertilizer are sources 
of nitrogen. Manure denitrifies at approximately twice the rate of inorganic fertilizer 
(Meisinger and Randall, 1991). Therefore, NAL for the New York models is (l-y2)x - y3xfa -
2y3xma.
20 NLEAP estimates NAL from data on annual precipitation and fertilizer applied, 
accounting for soil properties and crops. NAL is the nitrogen in the root zone after plant 
uptake and denitrification. This information is used to estimate the amount of nitrogen leached.
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One can estimate X in the leaching equation by non-linear least squares (NLS); or by 
ordinary least squares (OLS) from the logarithm of the inverted function which is linear in X:
, NAL -L  In -----------
NAL
Both estimates of X are in Table 5, but the NLS are used in the empirical applications because 
this procedure minimizes the sum of squared errors about L directly. The slightly larger OLS 
estimates of X would imply slightly larger leaching levels.
Table 5. Estimated Parameters for the Leaching Equations
Soil
Estimation
Method X t-ratio R2 a
N-A NLS 0.029440 83.81 0.93
OLS 0.030857 95.50 0.84
N-B NLS 0.010155 90.72 0.91
OLS 0.019034 95.90 0.84
N-C NLS 0.006871 44.13 0.68
OLS 0.007064 43.26 0.59
N-D NLS 0.023017 44.99 0.77
OLS 0.024903 51.51 0.69
N-E NLS 0.005567 31.73 0.60
OLS 0.005713 33.06 0.56
N-F NLS 0.009497 30.73 0.59
OLS 0.009982 33.30 0.56
N-G NLS 0.006510 31.69 0.63
OLS 0.006707 33.28 0.56
I-A NLS 0.006365 37.72 0.68
OLS 0.006514 39.57 0.64
I-B NLS 0.007171 37.50 0.68
OLS 0.007364 39.56 0.64
I-C NLS 0.002421 19.37 0.48
OLS 0.002451 19.62 0.43
I-D NLS 0.006188 37.66 0.67
OLS 0.006335 39.55 0.64
I-E NLS 0.006492 37.75 0.68
OLS 0.006647 39.62 0.64
a The R2 values indicate the goodness of fit. However, they cannot be interpreted 
as true R2 values either because X is estimated using NLS or because X is 
estimated using OLS without an intercept (Judge, et al., 1988).
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Since L is increasing in X, the estimates of X are consistent with general expectations. 
The smaller values for X for the heavy soil in Iowa, I-C, indicate less leaching potential than 
on the lighter soils. Likewise, in New York the lighter soils from hydrologic groups A and 
B, i.e. soils N-A, N-B, N-C, and N-D, generally have larger estimates of X than the hydrologic 
group C soils, i.e. soils N-E, N-F, and N-G. However, the relative magnitude of X for N-C, 
a group B soil, indicates that it leaches more than N-B soil, a group A soil; for N-D, another 
B soil, leaches less than N-E and N-G, both hydrologic group C soils.
The estimated leaching equations appear to both fit the data well and predict leaching 
well (Table 5). The t-ratios for the estimated parameters are large. The R2 values generally 
indicate good overall fits, although they are not true R2 values either because X is estimated 
using NLS or OLS without an intercept (Judge et al., 1988). The estimated leaching equations 
predict leachate well for all fertilizer levels at precipitation levels near the middle of the 
precipitation ranges used to generate the data. For the higher and lower extremes of the 
precipitation data, the leaching equations do not predict as well. Typically, given any fertilizer 
level, the estimated leaching equations over-predict leachate at low precipitation levels and 
under-predict leachate levels at high precipitation levels, acting to pull leachate levels closer 
to the mean. (See Thomas (1994) for details). Since this predictive behavior is consistent 
across all soils, the bias is not terribly disturbing because for the purposes of this study the 
relative leaching potential across soils is affected very little. In addition, the relatively high 
fertilizer levels from the com yield response functions should compensate for the implied 
under-prediction of leachate at high precipitation levels.
The Distribution o f Precipitation
Probability distributions for two random precipitation variables, six-month and annual 
precipitation, must also be estimated. Given the nature of precipitation data, any probability 
function used to estimate these distributions must be for a non-negative random variable and 
allow for possible asymmetry in the distribution. The highly flexible beta density 
accommodates both considerations and also contains many other families of distributions as 
special cases of itself (Johnson and Kotz, 1970, pp. 37-56). The beta density for a random 
variable z{ is:
T(a +|3) >zi° ' , (zu- z i)p"1 
T(a)T(P) Z- P '
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where
re?) 'e - 't^ - 'd t
)
and is the upper bound on the random variable.
The magnitude and relative magnitude of the parameters, a  and p, affect all moments
of the beta distribution. The mean of the distribution, p, is given by
a z
a  +P
; the standard
deviation, a, is given by
a p z u
( a  + P ) 2 ( a  +  p  + 1 )
1/2
; and the skewness coefficient of the
distribution, x, is given by.
2 a p ( p - a ) z u
. Ceteris paribus, increasing a  raises
a 3(a  + p)3(a + p + l)(a +p +2)
the expected zi5 and increasing p decreases expected z,. The standard deviation of Zj increases 
as either a  or p increase. Skewness depends on the relative magnitude of the parameters. The 
distribution is symmetric for a  = p. For a  > p, the distribution is skewed left. Conversely, 
a  < P indicates that the distribution is skewed right. Thus, an increase in the absolute 
magnitude of a , ceteris paribus, causes the distribution to be skewed more to the left; and an 
increase in the absolute magnitude of p causes the distribution to be skewed more to the right.
Estimates of the beta density parameters are obtained using maximum likelihood (ML). 
The ML estimate of a parameter is that value of a parameter for which the current sample, 
z ,,...^ , would most likely be drawn if the ML estimate is the population parameter of the 
distribution (Casella and Berger, 1990, p. 290).
If precipitation is identically and independently distributed, the likelihood function is:
L ( a , p ; z , , . . . , z n)
' r(a +  P )  '
T (  a ) T ( P ) n(a + (3-l)  zu
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The log likelihood used in maximum likelihood estimation is:
T(a +P) 
r(a)T(P)
n n
InL = n In + (a ~1) 52 l n  z i +  (P “1) 52 ln(zu ~ zi) “ n (a + P “ 1)ln zu•
i=l i = l
When maximizing the likelihood function, standard differentiation with respect to a  and 
P is not possible because the parameters are contained in the gamma functions. Dai et al. 
(1993), estimate a beta density for soil moisture by calling an IMSL, FORTRAN subroutine 
to numerically approximate integrals within MINOS, a FORTRAN based optimization program. 
This procedure, however, is cumbersome and requires extensive, original FORTRAN code. 
As an alternative, Casella in the Department of Plant Breeding and Biometry, Cornell 
University, suggested that Mathematica, which calls the gamma function directly (Wolfram, 
1991), be used for the maximum likelihood estimation.
To obtain the ML estimates for the six- and 12-month precipitation variables, data for 
a number of years are needed for both variables, as are upper bounds on precipitation. The 
two 30-year precipitation data series described above are used for this purpose. 21 The upper 
bound on precipitation is set so that it covers the precipitation ranges of all weather stations 
used in the corn-nitrogen-precipitation data.
The maximum likelihood estimates, means, standard deviations, and skewness 
coefficients for the distributions are reported in Table 6. As one would expect, the means and 
standard deviations for annual precipitation are greater than those for 6-month precipitation. 
Mean annual precipitation is slightly greater in New York than in Iowa, but the standard
21 Information from Iowa for six-month and annual precipitation, respectively, are:
30 30
5 2  l n z 6,i -  94.66, Y , l n ( z 6 , u - z 6,i) “ 69.74, n = 30, and z ^  = 35, and
i = l i = l
30 30
i = 1 i = l
For New York we have:
30 30
30 30
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Table 6. Maximum Likelihood Estimates and Distributional Characteristics of the 
Precipitation Variables
Precipitation
Variable ttML Pml Mean3
Standard
Deviation3 Skewness3 DvV
Iowa
12-month 6.80 2.32 33.6 6.2 -0.64 0.89
6-month 9.19 4.28 23.9 4.3 -0.39 0.41
New York
12-month 17.66 13.42 34.1 5.2 -0.09 0.71
6-month 9.00 9.38 19.6 4.5 0.02 0.80
3 Formulas for these characteristics of the beta density are given above in the 
text.
b Dv^n is the test statistic for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for goodness of fit.
deviation is smaller in New York. All else equal, leachate may be greater in New York. But, 
on the other hand, leachate will vary less due to random variation in precipitation in New York 
than in Iowa because of the smaller standard deviation of precipitation in New York. For the 
6-month distributions that affect crop yields, mean precipitation is slightly greater in Iowa than 
in New York, and the standard deviations are approximately the same. The distributions in 
Iowa are skewed left, indicating that precipitation near is more frequently observed than 
precipitation near zero. In New York, the skewness coefficients are near zero, especially for 
6-month precipitation, which indicates that the distributions are nearly symmetric.
After obtaining the ML estimates and selected moments, the surface of the log- 
likelihood function was examined to assure that the estimates are not local maxima. 
Specifically, the log-likelihood function was plotted in Mathematica using first a broad range 
of the parameters (zero to 100) and then a more narrow range about the ML estimates 
(generally from near 0 to 15 or 5 to 20, depending on the value of the ML estimate). In all 
cases, the surface of the log-likelihood function appears to be generally well-behaved, i.e. there 
appears to be only a single local and global maximum. Thomas (1994) contains a detailed 
discussion of this issue.
To test the hypothesis that precipitation is indeed distributed beta, a goodness of fit test 
is needed. Two such tests commonly used are the Chi-square test (Snedecor and Cochran, 
1989, pp. 76-79) and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (Spanos, 1986, pp. 228-229). The 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for goodness of fit is used here rather than the Chi-squared test
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because the Kolmogorov-Smimov hypothesis test evaluates the fit of the distribution at all 
sample points. The Chi-squared test, on the other hand, evaluates the fit of the distribution 
over intervals of the sample. Outcomes of the Chi-squared hypothesis test depend explicitly 
on how these intervals are specified, which makes the test somewhat subjective. No such 
subjectivity is involved in the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.22
The test statistics for the four precipitation densities, EVn, are given in Table 6. All 
four test statistics are less than y 10 = 1.23, indicating that the beta distributions with the ML 
estimates cannot be rejected as the true distributions for the random variables. The beta 
densities appear to be consistent with the precipitation data in both study regions.
The Chance Constraint on Nitrate Leachate
With the leaching equations and distribution of 12-month precipitation now estimated, 
the chance constraint can be manipulated into its final form. Equations (16) and (17) can be 
substituted into equation (18) to give:
where NALj = (l-y2)Xj - y3Xja and g(z12) = 1 - exp(-Lz12). Since g(z12) is invertible and 
separable, the left hand side can be rewritten as:
22 The Kolmogorov-Smimov hypothesis test for goodness of fit is:
H0: f(z; a,P) = f(z; a ML,pML)
H,: f(z; a,P) * f(z; a ML,pML) ^
Define the empirical cumulative distribution, Fn*(z), as 
Fn*(z) = (l/n)(number of z,s < z)
where the ZjS are the iid precipitation values from the sample, z ,,...^ . Then define:
D = max | Fn*(z) - F(z; a ^ p ^ )  |
The test statistic for the Kolmogorov-Smimov test for goodness of fit is D\/n. As n —> go, the 
limiting cumulative distribution of DVn = y is:
oo
F(y) = 1 - 2 ^2  exp(-2k2y2) for ys$R+
k=l
Using this cumulative distribution, one can determine ya such that Pr{y > ya} = a  and reject 
H0 at the 100(l-a)% level of significance if y > ya is observed. Common values for ya are 
y.10 = 1-23, y.05 = 1.36, and y 01 = 1.67.
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Using the density estimated above, z12a can be found such that Prob[z12 > z12a] = a. The 
chance constraint becomes:
which reduces to:
This latter equation is the form of the chance constraint explicitly used in the bioeconomic 
model for given values of a, LU5 and the calculated value of z12a. Two levels of a  are used 
to form separate, chance-constrained empirical models. These values are 0.05 and 0.25, i.e. 
leachate is restricted so that the probability that leachate exceeds an upper bound, Lu, is 0.05 
in one model and 0.25 in another model. The corresponding values for z12 a are z12 005 = 42.1 
and zi2,o25 = 38.3 inches in Iowa and z12005 = 42.6 and z12025 = 37.8 in New York. Ly is 
parametrically varied with each level of a  to cover a wide range of leaching scenarios.
Other Parameters and Restrictions
Remaining parameters in the bioeconomic models are the discount rate and the 
parameters that affect the amount of nitrogen in the crop root zone: y,, y2, y3, Nm, and Nf. The 
discount rate is assumed to be 5% in all models. The fraction of nitrogen in the root zone on 
com in year t carried over to year t+1 is given by y(. Unknown nitrogen losses (losses other 
than plant uptake, denitrification, and leaching) are accounted for in y,. Com uptakes 
approximately 60% of nitrogen available, implying y2 = 0.6 (Bock and Hergert, 1991). 
Denitrification rates of inorganic nitrogen fertilizer, y3, depends on the soil organic matter 
content and drainage classification (Meisinger and Randall, 1991), and are estimated to range 
from 0.1 to 0.175 in New York and 0.1 to 0.25 in Iowa. Nitrogen mineralized by the soil 
organic matter or accumulated through precipitation, Nm, varies by soil (Shaffer et al., 1991). 
These values are obtained using NLEAP.
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Researchers know little about the amount of nitrogen fixed by legume crops on specific 
soils (Schepers and Mosier, 1991). The amount of nitrogen fixed by a previous year’s soybean 
crop varies from approximately 50 to 85 lbs./acre in the Midwest (Evans and Barber, 1977). 
Schepers and Mosier (1991) report that the recommendations for several Midwestern states are 
for nitrogen fertilizer application to be reduced by 30 lbs./acre in a year following soybean 
production. Another "rule of thumb" is that the amount of nitrogen fertilizer applied per acre 
be reduced by one pound for every bushel of soybean yield per acre in the previous year 
(Schepers and Mosier, 1991). Given the uncertainty surrounding Nf, it is jointly manipulated 
along with the parameter for the unknown sources of nitrogen loss, y„ so that the reduction in 
nitrogen fertilizer on corn following soybeans is in the range of 30 to 85 lbs. from the studies 
reported above. As is seen below, values of Nf = 80 and y, = 0.4 yield a reasonable fertilizer 
credit from 30 to 45 lb./acre.
According to research by Evans and Barber (1977), values for nitrogen fixed by alfalfa 
in the New York models in the year prior to planting com, Nf, range from 115 lbs./acre to 
more than 300 lbs./acre. Fertilizer credits from a previous year’s alfalfa vary from 100 to 200 
lbs./acre, according to 1994 Cornell Recommends for Integrated Field Crop Management and 
the Cornell Field Crops Handbook (1978). As is the case for the Iowa models, y! and Nf are 
jointly manipulated in the empirical models so that a fertilizer credit of 100 to 200 lbs./acre 
is achieved. Values of Nf = 175 and yj = 0.4 result in reasonable fertilizer credits from 125 
to 150 lbs./acre.
Finally, a restriction is needed on the amount of manure that a farmer can spread as a 
source of nitrogen in the New York models. In the previous section on farm prices and costs, 
the cost of nitrogen from manure is relatively cheaper than inorganic nitrogen fertilizer, yet 
farmers generally supplement manure with inorganic nitrogen fertilizer. This is due to the fact 
that farmers generally have a limited supply of manure. For this reason, per acre manure 
application rates are restricted to be no more than 15 tons per acre, a typical rate for spreading 
manure in New York (Schmit, 1994). Assuming each ton of manure contains 3.5 lbs. of 
nitrogen {1994 Cornell Recommends for Integrated Field Crop Management), the amount of 
nitrogen fertilizer from manure is restricted to be no more than 52.5 lbs./acre.
SOLVING THE BIOECONOMIC MODELS
For a number of years, bioeconomic models have been used to study a wide variety of 
problems, ranging from fishing, hunting, and timber harvesting rates (Conrad, 1992; Clark,
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1985; Reed, 1984; Berck, 1979), optimal groundwater extraction and quality (Knapp, 1984; 
Gisser and Sanchez, 1980), and to pest and weed control and nutrient management in crop 
production (Lazarus and Dixon, 1984; Taylor and Burt, 1984; Johnson et al., 1991). Most 
empirical models involving a small number of state and control variables were solved using 
the forward or backward induction methods of dynamic programming (Bellman, 1957) or by 
the calculus of variations, whereby models are formulated using a Hamiltonian or an inter­
temporal Lagrangean function (Kamien and Schwartz, 1991).
Larger models, which also include other complexities such as non-linearities and the 
presence of both equality and inequality constraints, cannot be solved readily with these 
traditional methods. The bioeconomic models developed here fall into this category, their 
complexity rivaling that of Standiford and Howitt’s (1992) chance-constrained model of 
rangeland management. Recognizing, as they did, that our models are large, inter-temporal 
Lagrangean problems (Canon, et al., 1970), we also code them in GAMS, a modelling interface 
to access a FORTRAN based general non-linear solver called MINOS (Brooke et al., 1992).
Despite the availability of non-linear solvers such as MINOS, however, they must be 
applied with care. The major challenge is to formulate the model so that the routine converges 
to a local, as well as global optimum. On balance, this was only a minor concern, but we did 
perform a number of experiments with the models to ensure that the routines was converging 
properly. Thomas (1994) discusses this strategy in detail. In summary, we selected initial 
values and bounds on the variables carefully, and solved the models for a wide range of initial 
conditions to guarantee that the routine would converge to the same solution. Scaling seemed 
not to be an issue, perhaps in large measure due to specifying the models on a per acre basis. 
Although some initial experiments appeared problematic, the difficulties were resolved by 
setting very small non-zero lower bounds on the endogenous variables and by decreasing the 
optimality tolerance in MINOS from the default of 1.0E-6 to 1.0E-9. Finally, the same 
solutions were obtained using CONOPT, another non-linear solver supported by the GAMS 
interface.
The Base Solutions
To initiate the empirical analysis, we solved models for both the Iowa and New York 
soils using initial conditions and starting values given in Table 7; yj = 0.4, Nf = 50 lbs./acre 
for Iowa, and Nf = 125 lbs./acre for New York. There are no constraints on nitrate leachate. 
A 20-year time horizon is long enough for the solutions not to depend heavily on initial 
conditions and the terminal period. Initial conditions and starting values are selected based
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Table 7. Initial Conditions and Starting Values for the Bioeconomic Models
Iowa New York
x i /  =115 xMfa = 0
x2ta =150 x, tma = 52.5
x21 = 300 x2tfa = 100
8, t = 0.300 x2tma = 52.5
82t = 0.300 x2t = 300
831 = 0.400 CO II p 0 0
82t = 0.301
831 = 0.133
S4t = 0.133
85t = 0.133
Note: Initial conditions are for year zero; starting values are for years one
through 20. The variables are described above in the text.
on current practices, with soybeans (alfalfa) accounting for 40% of the land in com and 
soybeans in Iowa and in com and alfalfa in New York. Non-fertilizer sources of nitrogen can 
account for 100 to 200 lbs. of nitrogen in the crop root zone (Meisinger and Randall, 1991). 
The values for Nf and y, are chosen because they result in reasonable fertilizer credits for the 
legume crops.
Two sets of base models are described, ones with and without minimum crop rotation 
restrictions imposed. The ones with minimum rotations imposed are used as the base for 
policy comparisons, but when compared with solutions where no rotation restrictions are 
imposed, we obtain a good estimate of the inherent benefits to the environment resulting from 
growing crops in rotation. The difference in objective function values is the opportunity cost 
of the rotation, which reflects the minimum value of the pest control provided by the rotation. 
In addition, one can compare the expected annual nitrate leachate values between the models 
to determine the reduction in leachate that results from growing the crops in rotation.
Models Without Crop Rotation Restrictions
To characterize the solutions to the bioeconomic models without restrictions on crop 
rotations, nearly complete solutions to the models for I-B soil in Iowa and N-E soil in
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New York are given in Tables A1 and A2 of Appendix A.23 Solutions to the models for the 
other base soils in the two regions are similar. Average annual production, fertilizer, and 
expected nitrate leachate for all soils are given in Table 8.
For these conditions, the models adjust to continuous corn.24 Grain yields per acre 
(after field and harvest losses) range from 110 bu./acre on I-A soil to 170 bu./acre on I-D soil. 
Silage yields (after losses) are around 21 tons/acre on the better group A and B soils. On the 
poorer group C soils, yields average 16 tons/acre. Fertilizer application rates (x2a) are high as 
expected, ranging from 135 to 210 lbs./acre. Nitrogen credits from legume crops (x2a - x,a) are 
around 125 lbs./acre for alfalfa and 35 lbs./acre for soybeans. Expected nitrate leachate on 
most soils in Iowa is between 25 and 30 lbs./acre, with the exception of the heavier, I-C soil 
with only 9 lbs./acre. In New York, some of the lighter hydrologic group A and B soils leach 
as much as 60 lbs./acre, whereas the heavier hydrologic group C soils typically leach only 20 
lbs./acre. The more fertile soils in Iowa are more profitable than those in New York, with 
expected 20-year net farm revenues typically around $2,200/acre and $l,800/acre, respectively.
Characterizing the dynamics of the bioeconomic models, the solutions appear to adjust 
to approximate steady states (Tables A1 and A2). In Iowa, steady state is reached in one year. 
Adjustments toward steady state in the New York models generally take longer. Because the 
initial alfalfa rotation imposed in year zero avoids the first-year establishment cost of alfalfa, 
it is more profitable to complete the initial alfalfa rotation before switching to continuous 
com.
These solutions reflect the net farm returns and leachate if continuous corn could be 
sustained over a 20-year period, but they fail to account for existing crop rotations used by 
most farmers to mitigate weed and pest problems (e.g. see Lazarus and Dixon, 1984; Lazarus 
and Swanson, 1983; Taylor and Headley, 1975; and Hueth and Regev, 1974). If used as a 
basis of policy comparisons, they would surely overestimate leachate and expected net returns, 
and overstate adjustments needed to comply with nitrate reduction policies.
23 For New York models, the total fertilizer application rate is the sum of that from manure 
and inorganic fertilizer. The 15 tons of manure are always applied before any inorganic 
fertilizer is applied because it is only about two-thirds the cost per pound of N.
24 These crops are in rotation, but only at their minimum bounds of 0.002 acres. If no 
minimum rotation were imposed, these land fractions would be zero.
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Table 8. Average Per Acre Annual Production, Annual Leachate, and Farm Returns by Soil for the 
Bioeconomic Models with No Rotation Imposed8
Soil
20-Yr. 
Discounted 
Expected Net 
Return E(C,) E(C2) X,8 Y 8x2
Fraction 
o f Acre 
in Com
Fraction 
o f Acre 
in Legume 
Crop
Expected
Leachate
New York
N-A $1888.77 21.2 20.6 53 184 0.99 0.01 61.0
N-B 1910.44 21.1 20.7 53 181 0.99 0.01 28.9
N-C 2048.34 21.7 21.2 36 157 0.99 0.01 20.5
N-D 2060.95 21.7 21.2 20 150 0.99 0.01 56.2
N-E 1542.44 16.8 16.2 20 137 0.99 0.01 17.4
N-F 1581.45 16.7 16.2 0 123 0.99 0.01 25.9
N-G 1456.79 16.8 16.2 49 165 0.99 0.01 20.6
Iowa
I-A $1583.40 108 108 176 211 0.99 0.01 26.5
I-B 2380.08 152 152 158 193 0.99 0.01 29.9
I-C 2205.84 139 139 123 159 0.99 0.01 9.3
I-D 2756.46 171 171 136 170 0.99 0.01 26.6
I-E 2183.63 141 141 166 201 0.99 0.01 27.2
a In order to minimize the effects o f initial conditions and terminal period, the averages are calculated using 
years six through 15 rather than the entire 20-year time horizon.
Note: See the text for a description o f the variables.
Models with Minimum Legume Rotations Imposed
The base scenarios used in the policy analysis include minimum legume rotations. 
Because little is known about how the value of increased pest and weed control due to crop 
rotations varies by soil, minimum soybean (alfalfa) rotations of 40% (roughly the two state 
averages) are imposed on all soils.
Solutions for these restricted models for I-B and N-E soils are in Tables A3 and A4. 
Average data for all soils are in Table 9. Both the reduction in annual expected leachate and 
minimum value of the pest control provided by the rotation are given in Table 10. By growing 
crops in rotation, nitrate leachate decreases by 35 to 40% in both the Iowa and New York 
regions. The minimum value to the farmer of the increased pest and weed control from the 
rotation varies more dramatically, both within and between regions. In Iowa this implicit value 
is only $16/acre on I-A soil, because it has the lowest com yields. For the better soils, the 
value of it is above $250/acre on all other soils and reaching nearly $500/acre on I-D soil. In 
New York, the implicit value of the rotation for pest control is generally less than in Iowa,
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Table 9. Average Per Acre Annual Production, Annual Leachate, and Farm Returns by Soil for the
Bioeconomic Models with a Minimum Legume Rotation Imposed3
Soil
20-Yr. 
Discounted 
Expected Net 
Return E(C,) E(C2) V x2a
Fraction 
o f Acre 
in Com
Fraction 
o f Acre 
in Legume 
Crop
Expected
Leachate
New York
N-A $1672.12 21.2 20.5 53 182 0.6 0.4 38.9
N-B 1681.92 21.1 20.6 53 178 0.6 0.4 18.2
N-C 1765.07 21.7 21.2 35 154 0.6 0.4 13.1
N-D 1774.55 21.7 21.1 19 148 0.6 0.4 35.8
N-E 1449.59 16.7 16.2 19 133 0.6 0.4 11.2
N-F 1474.14 16.7 16.2 0 119 0.6 0.4 17.1
N-G 1399.68 16.8 16.2 47 162 0.6 0.4 13.0
Iowa
I-A $1567.31 108 108 174 209 0.6 0.4 16.2
I-B 2046.63 151 151 156 191 0.6 0.4 18.2
I-C 1942.25 139 139 123 156 0.6 0.4 5.9
I-D 2271.57 171 171 134 167 0.6 0.4 16.2
I-E 1928.08 141 141 164 199 0.6 0.4 16.6
a To minimize the effects o f initial conditions and terminal period, the averages here are calculated using years 
six to 15 rather than the entire 20-year time horizon.
Note: See the text for a description o f the variables.
ranging from $50 to $100/acre on the less productive, group C soils to $200 to $300/acre on 
the more productive, group A and B soils. Expressed as a percent of the 20-year expected net 
revenue from growing continuous corn, the minimum value of the pest control from growing 
crops in rotation over the 20-year period varies from one to 18%.
Solutions to the Chance-Constrained Bioeconomic Models
In the solutions where a chance constraint on leachate is imposed the values of a  = 0.05 
and a  = 0.25 reflect the probability that leachate exceeds some upper bound, Lv, is less than 
5 and 25%, respectively. Because of the uncertainty surrounding the effects of high nitrates 
on human health and the environment, Ly is also varied in 2.5 lbs./acre increments from the 
unconstrained leachate levels found in the base models to leachate near zero. While the 
objective function values and expected annual leachate levels for these solutions are critical for 
the policy analysis below, there is too much data to be reported here. The detail is in Thomas 
(1994); the information is used below in estimating the value of leachate permits. Complete 
solutions for soils I-B and N-E, are in Tables A5 through A12.
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Table 10. Farm and Environmental Values from Growing the Legume in Rotation with Com
Soil
Minimum Value of 
Pest and Weed 
Control from 
Rotating Crops1 
($/acre)
Value o f the Pest 
and Weed Control as 
a % of Net Revenue 
from Continuous 
Com
Leachate 
Reduction from 
Rotating Cropsb 
(lbs./acre)
Leachate
Reduction as a % 
o f Leachate from 
Continuous Com
Iowa
I-A $16.09 1.0 10.4 38.9
I-B 333.45 14.0 11.7 39.1
I-C 263.59 12.0 3.4 36.6
I-D 484.89 17.6 10.4 39.1
I-E 255.55 11.7 10.6 39.0
New York
N-A $216.64 11.5 22.1 36.2
N-B 228.52 12.0 10.7 37.0
N-C 283.26 14.3 7.4 36.1
N-D 286.40 13.9 20.4 36.3
N-E 92.85 6.0 6.2 35.6
N-F 107.31 6.8 8.7 34.0
N-G 57.12 3.9 7.6 36.9
a Calculated as the difference in the objective function values between the bioeconomic models with 
no rotation imposed and a 40% legume rotation.
b Calculated as the difference in annual expected leachate between the bioeconomic models with no 
rotation imposed and a 40% legume rotation.
The Iowa models respond to decreases in Ly and decreases in a  by increasing the 
fraction of the land in soybeans and corn following soybeans and decreasing the amount of 
nitrogen fertilizer applied and, in turn, the amount of nitrogen available in the crop root zone. 
These shifts are expected because by decreasing Ly and/or decreasing a, the chance constraint 
is more restrictive, resulting in lower nitrogen fertilizer application rates and a shift of land out 
of continuous com. Similar observations can be made regarding the impact of decreasing Ly 
and a  in the New York models.
Comparing the solutions for I-B in Iowa more closely, decreasing Ly from 20 to 10 
lbs./acre while keeping a  constant at 0.05 (Tables A5 and A6) results in only a small decrease 
in the fertilizer application rates, 2 to 3 lbs./acre; whereas the majority of the adjustment takes 
place in the crop rotation—a shift from 43 to 71% of the land in soybeans. On the other hand, 
if Lu is decreased from 20 to 10 lbs./acre while a  is 0.25 rather than 0.05 (Tables A7 and A8), 
then a more dramatic decrease occurs in the nitrogen fertilizer application rates, 20 to 30 
lbs./acre. The land in soybeans increases from 40 to 79%, similar to the rotations with 
a  = 0.05 and Ly set at 20 and 10 lbs./acre, respectively.
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Examining the various chance-constrained solutions for N-E soil brings out an important 
difference between the chance-constrained solutions to the New York and Iowa models: in the 
New York models there are benefits from rotating crops in cycles. For instance, in Table A10 
the fraction of the land in first year alfalfa, 531, tends to vary from a relatively high value in 
one year to a relatively low value in the next year, followed by an intermediate value in the 
next year. Then this cycle begins again by returning to a high value, then a low value, and 
then an intermediate value, and so on.
As a result of the cyclical behavior in the crop rotations, comparing the solutions for 
the N-E soil is not as straightforward as it is for the I-B soil. As seen in Tables A9 and A10, 
decreasing L,j from 10 to 5 lbs./acre while maintaining a  at 0.05 typically increases the land 
in alfalfa from around 55% with Ll, at 10 lbs./acre to between 75 and 85% with L,, at 5 
lbs./acre. Nitrogen fertilizer application rates on continuous corn with Ly at 10 lbs./acre are 
typically 90 to 125 lbs./acre; whereas they drop to between 55 and 125 lbs./acre with L,, at 5 
lbs./acre. The fertilizer application rates and crop rotations in Tables A9 and A10 are similar 
to those in Tables A ll and A12, where Lu is set at 10 and 5 lbs./acre but a  is 0.25 rather than 
0.05.
Some perspective on differential effects of a chance constraint on net farm revenues 
between soils are seen in Table 11. The chance constraint reduces 20-year expected net returns 
the most, $368, on I-D, the most productive soil. In contrast, the chance constraint is not 
binding and has no effect on I-C soil. Similarly, the chance constraint reduces farm revenues 
very little (only $33) on I-A soil because it is the least productive soil. In the New York 
models, the chance constraint with L,, set at 10 lbs./acre and a  = 0.05 results in larger 
decreases in net revenue for the more productive group A and B soils (N-A through N-D). 
These decreases, $175 to $435, are comparable to those on the most productive Iowa soils.
COMPARING POLICIES THAT REDUCE NITRATE LEACHATE
We can use the solutions to the bioeconomic models to compare policies to reduce 
nitrate leachate. Emphasis is on the changes in production and income, and in this sense, we 
determine the economic stakes involved in policy choice. This is an important first step in 
evaluation, but is separate from administrative issues. The latter issues affect the economic 
viability of each policy and are addressed briefly in our concluding remarks. Six policies, all 
variations of the standards approach outline above, are compared: a sales tax on nitrogen 
fertilizer, a uniform quantity restriction on annual nitrogen fertilizer applied, a restriction on
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Table 11. The Effect of the Leachate Chance Constraint on the Discounted Present
Value of 20-Year Expected Net Farm Returns
Soil
Objective Function,3 
Base Model 
($)
Objective Function, 3 
Prob[L > 10] < 0.05 
($)
Difference
($)
I-A 1,567 1,534 33
I-B 2,047 1,752 295
I-C 1,942 1,942 0
I-D 2,272 1,904 368
I-E 1,928 1,715 213
N-A 1,672 1,314 358
N-B 1,682 1,463 219
N-C 1,765 1,593 172
N-D 1,775 1,339 436
N-E 1,450 1,408 41
N-F 1,474 1,343 131
N-G 1,400 1,362 38
3 The objective function measures the discounted present value of 20-year expected 
net farm returns.
annual expected leachate, and three schemes of pollution permits for annual expected leachate. 
These include: (i) permit sales at a fixed price, (ii) a permit auction, and (iii) a system of 
tradable permits.
The policy objectives are stated in terms of reducing annual expected leachate by 10 
and 25%. This strays somewhat from the notion of a chance constraint, but that is unavoidable 
given that all soils could not be incorporated into a regional model. However, the expected 
leachate for a soil has an associated upper bound on leachate Ly for a given probability level: 
Prob[L > Ly] < a. By finding an average of these upper bounds for all soils weighted by 
acreage, we can ex post approximate the regional upper bound on leachate that will not be 
exceeded for a given probability level. More is said about this below.
Regional production, leaching, and farm returns in Table 12 are used as a base of 
comparison for the policy analysis. By reflecting current crop rotations, expected nitrate 
leachate is already 9.3 and 12.7 pounds per acre less in Iowa and New York, respectively, than 
if continuous com were being raised. On a per acre basis net farm returns in the Iowa region 
are 28% higher than in the New York region. This difference is due in large measure to the 
relative productivity of the soils and is reflected in the value of farm real estate as well.
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Table 12. Current Annual Production, Annual Leachate, and 20-Year Net Farm 
Returns on an Acre of a Composite Soil
New York Iowa
20-Yr. Net Farm Returns (,000) $209,033 $482,481
Com Production (,000) 1,470 tons 21,251 bu.
Legume Production (,000) 191 tons 3,890 bu.
Nitrogen Fertilizer (,000) 9,300 lbs. 22,185 lbs.
Land in Corn 78,560 acres 142,132 acres
Land in Legumes 52,373 acres 94,755 acres
Expected Annual Leachate (,000) 2,972 lbs. 3,459 lbs.
Expected Leachate/Acre 22.7 lbs. 14.6 lbs.
Com Yield a 20.6 tons 150 bu.
Nitrogen Fertilizer/Acrea 164 lbs. 179 lbs.
Note: Calculated from data in Tables 2 and 9.
These quantities are for continuous com.
Recent estimates by USDA for the value of land and buildings are $1,157 and $1,031 per acre 
in Iowa and New York, respectively (New York Agricultural Statistics, 1992-93).
A Tax on Nitrogen Fertilizer
Conceptually it is easy to determine the effects of this policy on agricultural production 
and leachate by merely raising the cost of nitrogen fertilizer in the bioeconomic models by the 
amount of the tax. The situation, however, is more complicated because each model deals with 
a single soil and any particular tax would not necessarily lead to the same percentage reduction 
in expected leachate. Therefore, soil-specific models are solved for a given tax rate, and the 
reduction in leachate on a composite acre is calculated as a weighted average. Finally, this 
procedure is repeated using successively higher tax rates until the desired reduction in expected 
annual leachate on the composite acre (10 or 25%) is reached.
The tax rates that lead to a decrease in annual expected leachate by 10% are 38 and 
129% in New York and Iowa, respectively. To reduce expected leachate by 25%, the tax rates 
needed are much higher, 141 and 260% in New York and Iowa, respectively (Table 13). 
These tax rates are high, but they do embody an accurate reflection of the transition of applied
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Table 13. Changes in Farm Returns and Production for a Tax on Nitrogen Fertilizer
10% Decrease in 
Expected Leachate
25% Decrease in 
Expected Leachate
Item Iowa New York Iowa New York
Tax Rate (%) 129 38 141 
---- Percent Change From Base-
260
20-Yr. Net Farm Returns -8 -3 -14 -4
Com Production -6 -10 -21 -23
Legume Production 6 11 23 24
Land Producing Corn -5 -7 -15 -16
Land Producing Legume 6 11 23 24
Total Nitrogen Applied -22 -30 -53 -66
Com Yield/Acrea -3 -15 -8 -29
Nitrogen Applied/Acre3 -15 -32 -31 -68
a These per acre quantities are for continuous com.
inorganic nitrogen fertilizer into nitrogen leached. They reflect the inelastic nature of the 
implicit price elasticity of demand for nitrogen fertilizer implied in the production response.25 
They are also consistent with other studies. For instance, Pan and Hodge (1994) needed a tax 
of 790% to reduce nitrate leachate by 50%, while Taylor et al. (1992) found that a 50% tax 
on nitrogen fertilizer resulted in less than a 2% decrease in nitrate leachate. For Johnson et 
al. (1991) a 100% tax on nitrogen fertilizer was needed for a one-third reduction in leachate.
The taxes on nitrogen fertilizer decrease net farm income over the 20-year time horizon 
by less than 5% in New York (Table 13). In Iowa, the percentage decreases in net farm 
returns are slightly higher, 8% for a 10% reduction in leachate and 14% for a 25% reduction 
in leachate. The relatively higher reductions in farm returns for the Iowa region reflect the 
higher productivity of Iowa soils in growing com and the relative profitability of growing 
soybeans in Iowa compared to alfalfa in New York.
The nitrogen tax also decreases total com production, increases total legume production, 
decreases the amount of land producing corn, and decreases the total amount of nitrogen
25 These implicit price elasticities range from -0.23 to -0.28 for New York soils and are 
consistently about -0.19 for all Iowa soils.
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fertilizer applied in a region (Table 13). The fact that corn production falls by more than does 
land in com is due to the effects on corn yields from the large reductions in the use of nitrogen 
fertilizer applied—22 and 30% decreases for a 10% reduction in leachate in Iowa and 
New York, respectively, and 53 and 66% decreases for a 25% reduction in leachate in Iowa 
and New York, respectively. Com yields decrease relatively more in the New York region. 
In general, the shift away from com and toward using less nitrogen fertilizer is more dramatic 
in the New York region.
A Quantity Restriction on Nitrogen Fertilizer Application
To study the effects of the fertilizer restriction, the base bioeconomic models are 
adapted by adding a constraint for the nitrogen fertilizer application rate. To find the uniform 
fertilizer restriction, the models are solved for different restrictions on fertilizer application 
rates until the desired reductions in annual leachate on a composite acre are identified.
Restrictions on the maximum amount of nitrogen fertilizer that can be applied per acre 
which lead to the desired 10 and 25% reductions in expected leachate are 104 and 47 lbs./acre, 
respectively, in New York and 117 and 75 lbs./acre, respectively, in Iowa (Table 14). The 
percentage reductions in the total fertilizer use in New York and Iowa to realize a 10% reduc­
tion in leachate are nearly the same. However, moving beyond this point to a 25% reduction 
in leachate requires a substantially greater reduction in fertilizer application in the New York 
region. This can only be explained by the differential nature of the leaching and nitrogen 
response between the two regions. Also, in the base scenario, per acre leachate is higher in 
New York than in Iowa. Thus, reducing leachate by 25% requires leachate to be reduced by 
nearly 6 lbs./acre in New York, compared with about 3.5 lbs./acre in Iowa.
Shifts in income and production are similar to those incurred under a nitrogen fertilizer 
tax. The uniform fertilizer restrictions decrease 20-year net farm income in the New York 
region less than 5% for both the 10 and 25% reductions in leachate (Table 14). The income 
reductions in Iowa are again slightly higher. Changes in production and land use are similar 
to those resulting from the fertilizer tax.
Perhaps the most important contrast is that when compared with the tax on fertilizer, 
a direct restriction on fertilizer leads generally to larger reductions in total nitrogen applied and 
to less substitution of legumes for com. These differences are in large measure due to the fact 
that by taxing fertilizer one decreases the profitability of growing corn over the entire possible 
range of nitrogen application rates and com yields. The fertilizer restriction, on the other hand,
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Table 14. Changes in Farm Returns and Production for a Uniform Restriction on 
Nitrogen Fertilizer Application Rates
Item
10% Decrease in 
Expected Leachate
25% Decrease in 
Expected Leachate
Iowa New York Iowa New York
Restriction (lbs./Acre) 117 104 75 47
......Percent Change From Base-
20-Yr. Net Farm Returns -2 -1 -7 -5
Corn Production -5 -7 -19 -25
Legume Production 1 2 13 21
Land Producing Corn 1 1 -8 -13
Land Producing Legume 1 2 13 21
Total Nitrogen Applied -26 -28 -56 -71
Corn Yield/Acrea -10 -17 -22 -30
Nitrogen Applied/Acrea -35 -37 -58 -71
a These per acre quantities are for continuous com.
only limits the profitability of corn at nitrogen levels above the restriction. Thus, for the tax 
on nitrogen fertilizer, legumes become relatively more profitable.
A Restriction on Expected Annual Nitrate Leachate on All Soils
The most direct policy for decreasing leachate is to restrict expected leachate itself on 
each soil by 10 and 25% relative to base levels. This is accomplished by adding an expected 
leachate constraint to the base bioeconomic models. Results are in Table 15.
In general, shifts in production and income are similar to those found under either the 
tax or quantity restriction on fertilizer, although regional farm incomes are slightly higher, 
nitrogen fertilizer applications rates remain higher, and there is a larger increase in legume 
acreage. The explanation is simple. We know from our theoretical discussion that if the 
objective is to restrict total leachate in the region, then the least-cost solution is to restrict total 
leachate directly rather than indirectly by taxing or restricting a polluting input. Put differently, 
this is the least-cost solution because farmers remain free to choose the proper substitution 
between crop rotation and fertilizer application to achieve the leachate level. And it is more
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Table 15. Changes in Farm Returns and Production for a Uniform Percentage 
Reduction in Base Leachate Level on Each Soil
10% Decrease in 
Expected Leachate
25% Decrease in 
Expected Leachate
Item Iowa New York Iowa New York
20-Yr. Net Farm Returns -2
---- Percent Change From Base­
-1 -6 -4
Com Production -8 -8 -23 -25
Legume Production 6 7 32 30
Land Producing Corn -5 -5 -22 -20
Land Producing Legume 8 7 32 30
Total Nitrogen Applied -23 -27 -41 -58
Com Yield/Acre3 -3 -15 -3 -19
Nitrogen Applied/Acre3 -13 -29 -15 -41
These per acre quantities are for continuous corn.
profitable to substitute away from com to more legume acreage but sustain higher fertilizer 
application rates on the remaining corn. Despite its advantages, however, this policy restricts 
leachate on every soil and disregards differences in the value of leaching between individual 
soils. The best way to assess the importance of these differences is through a comparison with 
leachate permit schemes which by design impute these values to the various soils.
Pollution Permits for Every Pound o f Expected Annual Nitrate Leachate
To examine the three systems of pollution permits, we must organize the output from 
the models to: (i) derive soil-specific demands for leachate permits, (ii) determine how the 
leachate reduction is achieved by each scheme, (iii) develop an analytical procedure for 
eliciting the differences in farm returns, production, and public revenues among schemes, and 
(iv) formulate a programming procedure for allocating permits among soils.
Soil-Specific Demands for Leachate Permits. Since restrictions on expected annual nitrogen 
leachate restrict farmers’ production alternatives, a step-wise demand schedule for leachate 
permits can be derived directly from solutions to models with successively tighter restrictions 
on annual expected leachate. This is done simply by dividing the difference between the 
objective function values for the two solutions by the difference in annual expected leachate
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levels. The numerous chance-constrained solutions to the models described above and their 
corresponding 20-year expected net returns and annual leachate levels are used for this purpose. 
The step-wise, parametric demand functions for leachate permits based on these data are given 
in Appendix B. It is clear from the schedules that permits on the more leachable soils do not 
always carry the highest price. The value of a permit on a particular soil is determined by the 
combination of the leachability and productivity of the soil. For example, N-A soil is a highly 
leachable but relatively productive soil from hydrologic group A, and N-E soil is a much less 
leachable but also less productive soil from hydrologic group C. Permits are worth up to $18 
on N-A soil and $36 on N-E soil.
Reaching the Desired Reduction in Expected Nitrate Leachate. Although farmers’ demand 
schedules for leachate permits do not change across the three permit schemes, the ways in 
which they are used to reach a reduction in expected leachate does. Consider a scheme where 
permits sell at P*, the price which calls out the desired regional reduction in expected leachate, 
L*. In order to reduce total leachate in the region to L*, P* must be set such that
n
^2  cOjLj* < L * where n is the number of soils within the region, co, is the number of acres of
i = l
soil i in the region, and Lj* is the quantity of permits demanded per acre of soil i at price P*, 
from Appendix B. If permits are auctioned rather than sold at a fixed price, there is no need 
to know the per acre permit demands to achieve the desired regional reduction in leachate. An 
agency simply determines the desired leachate, L*, and auctions that many permits.26 Under 
the third permit scheme, an agency initially allocates the L* permits in proportion to base-case 
leachate levels, and allows farmers to trade those permits. Similar to the auction, the agency 
simply determines L* and then distributes those L* permits in proportion to base-case levels.27
A Graphical Analysis of the Differences in the Three Permit Schemes. Although the expected 
leachate levels of all three permit schemes are the same, one may expect shifts in production 
and net farm returns to differ among the three leachate permit mechanisms. A graphical 
analysis is used to illustrate the differences (Figures 2-4). It is shown that under each of the 
three permit schemes, agricultural production is identical because expected leachate levels for 
the soils are identical. Net farm returns, on the other hand, differ.
26 It is assumed permits are auctioned one at a time and that farmers bid the exact amount 
that each individual permit is worth to them, essentially allowing the regulatory agency to act 
as a perfectly price discriminating monopolist.
27 Suppose one wants a 10 % reduction in expected leachate. For a farmer with 100 acres 
of one soil that leaches 15 lbs./acre/year under base conditions and 200 acres of another that 
leaches 30 lbs./acre/year, the agency initially allocates 0.9[15(100) + 30(200)] = 5400 permits.
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First, consider a farmer’s demand for permits on soil i (Figure 2).28 If a farmer can 
freely leach nitrates, then he/she leaches Lic and obtains the economic surplus associated with 
areas A + B + C.28 9 If permits are sold at a fixed price, P*, a farmer demands L;* permits on 
soil i and pays an amount associated with area B (P* • L;*). The loss in surplus is area C. On 
the other hand, assuming that farmers bid the amount for each permit corresponding to the 
intersection of a price line and their demand curve, an agency, acting as a perfectly 
discriminating monopolist and auctions permits, extracts all of the area under the demand up 
to Lj*, areas A + B (Figure 2). The last permit auctioned sells for P* on each soil. Loss to the 
farmer is area C because his leachate is reduced from L; c to L,*.
To compare the costs of the previous two permit schemes with those in which permits 
are initially allocated proportionally to base leachate levels and then traded, it is assumed that 
the market for tradable permits must be perfectly competitive and in equilibrium at P \ and no 
farmers can possess large enough shares of permits to effectively increase or decrease the 
price.30 Under these conditions, there is an excess supply of permits on some soils and an 
excess demand on others. If the initial distribution of permits on soil i is L; > L,* at P* (Figure 
3), a farmer sells the L; - Lj* permits and collects revenue equal to area D + E. Conversely, 
if the initial distribution of permits is Lj < Lj* at P* (Figure 4), the farmer purchases Lj* - Lf 
permits for area G, with a gain equal to area F + G. The net gain is area F. After all trading 
has occurred among farmers, all farmers will possess Lj* permits per acre of soil i, and 
expected nitrate leachate on each acre of soil i is identical.
28 We use a smooth demand curve, but implications for step-wise demands are the same.
29 The area under the demand curve is the value (surplus) of leaching on an acre of soil.
30 If these assumptions are not made, then per acre amounts farmers pay for permits or gain 
from selling permits may differ across farmers for a specific soil. For instance, suppose a 
farmer possesses a large excess supply of permits compared to all other farmers. He may 
emerge as a permit price leader, similar to a Stackelberg leader (Gibbons, 1992), creating 
additional revenues from selling his permits compared to farmers selling only a small number 
of permits. To assess regional effects of these situations, the existence and type of equilibrium 
would have to be known, including the exact approach path taken towards the equilibrium 
price, P*, provided that such an equilibrium is eventually reached. This would require 
information on the individual market shares for all farmers and their exact reactions to permits 
bought and sold by all other farmers. Because this information is not known, the permit 
market is assumed to be perfectly competitive and in equilibrium.
60
Price of 
Permits
Permit Demand
Permits on 
Soili
Figure 2. Reducing Leachate by Selling Permits at a Fixed Price
Price of 
Permits
Figure 3. Excess Supply of Permits Given an Initial Allocation of 
~ Tradable Permits
Com and legume production on soil i are the same for each permit scheme, as is the 
amount of nitrogen fertilizer applied and the crop rotation. This must be the case because: 
(i) each of the permit schemes results in an expected leachate level of L/ on soil i, (ii) Lj* is 
determined using the permit demand for soil i, and (iii) the permit demand is based on 
maximizing net farm returns subject to leaching being less than or equal to Lj*.
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Price of 
Permits
Figure 4. Excess Demand of Permits Given an Initial Allocation of
Tradable Permits
A Programming Model to Allocate Permits bv Soil. To continue the policy comparisons, a 
method is needed to find the quantity of permits demanded on specific soils (L;*) in both 
regions so that regional expected annual leachate is reduced by 10 and 25%. If P* is known, 
Lj* can be easily found using the step-wise permit demand schedules. To simplify things, a 
linear programming model is formulated to calculate the soil-specific quantities of permits 
demanded at a given price. The problem maximizes the sum of the economic surpluses under 
the individual soils’ per acre demands but above the permit price. This model, resembling an 
allocation or a separable programming model (Gass, 1985), is:
n mj
max y  y  v..L..Z—/ Z—i  ij ij
i=i j=i
subject to
n mi
£ £ wiLi i s  l -
i*l j=l
L.. > 0 for all i, j
where i represents the soil type (i -  l,...,n); j represents a step along the per acre permit 
demand schedule for soil i that where (j = 1,...,!^); step j = 1 along a permit is the step
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associated with the highest price along the demand, step j = 2 is the step associated with the 
second highest price along the demand, and so on; Vjj is the price associated with step j along
the permit demand for soil i less the agency’s given permit price, L;j is the width of step j in
the permit demand schedule for soil i, L( ■ is the quantity of permits endogenously determined 
that are associated with step j along the per acre demand for soil i, w; is the number of acres 
of soil i in the region, and L* is the desired regional expected leachate level.
The step-wise nature of the demands, however, poses a small problem when trying to 
find the permit price that by itself would result in farmers leaching the desired regional level 
of leachate. The problem is that at a relatively low permit price, the desired regional leachate 
level will be met by the permit demands calculated in the programming model because of the 
restriction in the model. But in reality at relatively low permit prices, farmers may demand 
more permits than those calculated by the programming model because farmers will not 
observe any such restriction on regional leachate. To find that price which by itself results in 
the desired regional leachate level, the model is solved for relatively high prices so that the 
regional leachate constraint is not binding. The price is lowered sequentially until a price 
which gives the desired reduction in expected leachate is found.31
Empirical Evaluation of the Three Permit Mechanisms. The permit prices needed to achieve 
10 and 25% reductions in expected annual leachate are the same for all permit schemes, and 
are estimated at $8.43 and $15.55, respectively, in the New York region and $25.49 and 
$31.89, respectively, in the Iowa region (Table 16). As one would expect, the permits are 
worth more to farmers in the Iowa region than in New York because of the relatively higher 
profitability of the Iowa soils.
Leachate permits demanded per acre are in Table 16. In New York, generally more 
permits are demanded on the soil in hydrologic groups A and B; they are more productive yet 
typically leach more than the hydrologic group C soils. In Iowa, no permits are demanded on 
I-A soil, mainly because it is the least productive soil for growing corn. The more productive 
yet more leachable soils, I-B and I-D soils, have the greatest quantities of permits demanded 
(more than 10 permits/acre). Although a few permits are demanded on I-C soil (about 6 
permits/acre), this leachate level corresponds to its unrestricted leachate level.
31 By reducing leachate by exactly 10 or 25%, the permits demanded for one soil in the 
region falls along one step (or between solutions to the bioeconomic models) rather than at the 
end of a step (or at one solution to a bioeconomic model). Thus, information on production 
and farm returns presented below are interpolations between the two solutions.
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Table 16. Permit Prices and Leachate Quantities Demanded (Lbs./Acre)
Soil
Per Acre Quantities of Permits 
Demanded for a 10% Decrease 
in Expected Leachate
Per Acre Quantities of Permits 
Demanded for a 25% Decrease 
in Expected Leachate
New York Price = $8.34 Price = $15.55
N-A 32.8 17.6
N-B 16.6 16.0
N-C 12.3 12.3
N-D 32.4 29.0
N-E 10.2 10.2
N-F 16.0 12.4
N-G 10.6 6.8
Iowa Price = $25.49 Price = $31.89
I-A 0.0 0.0
I-B 17.2 13.8
I-C 5.9 5.9
I-D 15.5 15.5
I-E 13.3 0.0
The relative changes in crop production, fertilizer rates, and crop rotations in Table 17 
are generally similar to those under other policies, with a few exceptions. In Iowa, the permit 
schemes for a 10% reduction in leachate result a greater reduction in land producing corn and 
a higher nitrogen fertilizer application rate than do other policies. However, for a 25% 
reduction in leachate, the least amount of land in corn and the greatest nitrogen fertilizer 
application rate occurs under the uniform restriction on leachate. In New York, the permit 
schemes result in the highest nitrogen fertilizer application rates of all policies for both the 10 
and 25% reductions in leachate. The permit schemes result in relatively little corn acreage 
compared with other policies in New York. Only the nitrogen fertilizer tax for a 10% decrease 
in leachate results in less corn acreage in New York than do the permit schemes.
As can be expected, the most costly permit mechanism in terms of reductions in farm 
returns is the permit auction (Table 18). For example, for a 10% reduction in leachate in the 
New York region , if permits are auctioned, net farm returns (including the cost of permits to 
farmers) are $152 million, compared with $185 million when permits are sold at a fixed price
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Table 17. Changes in Annual Production when Annual Expected Leachate is 
Reduced by All Three Leachate Permit Schemes
10% Decrease in 
Expected Leachate
25% Decrease in 
Expected Leachate
Item Iowa New York Iowa New York
Corn Production -6
--Percent Change From Base­
-8 -18 -26
Legume Production 9 8 27 34
Land Producing Corn -7 -5 -18 -23
Land Producing Legume 9 8 27 34
Total Nitrogen Applied -16 -27 -33 -58
Corn Yield/Acrea -4 -14 -9 -17
Nitrogen Applied/Acrea -11 -28 -20 -37
a These per acre quantities are for continuous com.
Table 18. 20-Year Net Farm Returns and Leachate Permit Costs for Three Permit Schemes
Region Net
Returns
Farm Cost 
Fixed 
Price
Farm
Cost
Auction
Net Returns 
Fixed Price 
(% A from 
Base)
Net Returns 
Auction 
(% A from 
Baseline)
Net Returns 
Tradable 
Permits 
(% A from 
Base)
$ million..................
10% Decrease Expected Leachate
NY 208 23 55 185 152 208
(-12) (-27) (0)
IA 478 79 126 399 352 478
(-17) (-27) (-0)
25% Decrease Expected Leachate
NY 202 35 50 167 152 202
(-20) (-27) (0)
464 83 111 381 353 464
IA (-21) (-27) (-0)
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and $208 million when tradable permits are allocated initially. Not surprisingly, all net benefits 
(economic surpluses or rents) a farmer could potentially gain from leaching nitrates are 
extracted by the discriminating monopolist. These regional surpluses are 27% in both regions 
for a 10% reduction in leachate and are also roughly the same in both for a 25% reduction in 
leachate.32 Selling permits at a fixed price extracts less economic surplus from farmers than 
does the permit auction. Tradable permits33 is the least costly to the farm community, but 
there is a redistribution of income among individual farmers.
For the system of tradable permits, it is important to examine the initial and final 
distributions of permits (Tables 19 and 20). The largest number of permits traded per acre 
occurs on N-A, N-G, I-A and I-E soils. While per acre trade is not always large, a substantial 
number of permits is traded in total. In New York for the 10 and 25% reductions in leachate, 
respectively, roughly 37,000 (1%) and 144,000 (7%) of the initial permits are traded. In Iowa, 
about 162,000 (5%) and 253,000 (10%) permits are traded, respectively. Interestingly, a much 
higher proportion of permits are traded in the case where expected leachate is restricted most 
severely. Under these circumstances, their value at the margin is raised for all soils, because 
there are fewer permits available, and there is more to be gained from trade.
Distribution o f Benefits, Policy Costs, and Revenue Transfers
To do a complete evaluation of the alternative policies that achieve an environmental 
standard, one must have some idea of the distribution of benefits and costs among various 
groups in society. We are not able to estimate the health benefits here, but we can approximate 
the upper bounds on the chance constraints which provide some relative measure of the safety 
associated with each policy. Also, the costs to firms and the public revenues generated under 
the various policies are of general interest.
The Chance Constraint. Because the models are formulated by soil, the best that can 
be done to identify the relative safety for each policy is to approximate the upper bound on the 
regional chance constraint. Recalling that a chance constraint restricts leachate by limiting the 
probability that leachate exceeds some harmful upper bound, we can for each policy and 
probability level, approximate the upper bounds by aggregating the specific soil results. In the
32 These surpluses are calculated by weighing the per acre surplus on an individual soil 
by the number of acres of soil (Table 2).
33 Base leachate levels for the soils are the expected annual leachate levels (Table 9).
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Table 19. Initial Allocation o f Leachate (Lbs.) Permits Per Acre under the Tradable Permit Scheme and 
the Number o f Permits Bought or Sold Per Acre by Soil
10% Reduction in Leachate 25% Reduction in Leachate
Soil
Initial
Allocation
Permits
Demanded
Permits
Bought
(Sold)
Initial
Allocation
Permits
Demanded
Permits
Bought
(Sold)
New York
N-A 35.0 32.8 (2.2) 29.1 17.6 (11.5)
N-B 16.3 16.6 0.3 13.6 16.0 2.4
N-C 11.8 12.3 0.5 9.8 12.3 2.5
N-D 32.2 32.4 0.2 26.8 29.0 2.2
N-E 10.0 10.2 0.2 8.4 10.2 1.8
N-F 15.4 16.0 0.6 12.8 12.4 (0.4)
N-G 11.7 10.6 (1.1) 9.7 6.8 (2.9)
Iowa
I-A 14.5 0.0 (14.5) 12.1 0.0 (12.1)
I-B 16.4 17.2 0.8 13.7 13.8 0.1
I-C 5.3 5.9 0.6 4.4 5.9 1.5
I-D 14.6 15.5 0.9 12.2 15.5 3.3
I-E 14.9 13.3 (1.6) 12.4 0.0 (12.4)
Table 20. 
Permits is
Total Regional Leachate Permits (Lbs./Acre) Traded by Soil After an Initial Allocation of 
Distributed Proportionally to Base-Level Leaching1
10% Reduction in Leachate 25% Reduction in Leachate
Soil Permits Bought Permits Sold Permits Bought Permits Sold
New York (2.7 Million Initial Permits) (2.2 Million Initial Permits)
N-A 0 11,154 0 58,949
N-B 1,981 0 99,691 0
N-C 5,137 0 18,940 0
N-D 8,147 0 13,433 0
N-E 1,089 0 17,921 0
N-F 21,033 0 0 15,537
N-G 0 25,652 0 69,880
Iowa (3.1 Million Initial Permits) (2.6 Million Initial Permits)
I-A 0 144,751 0 120,626
I-B 87,517 0 15,659 0
I-C 34,352 0 85,880 0
I-D 41,270 0 152,476 0
I-E 0 17,301 0 132,477
1 Due to rounding of the per acre demands, the total number o f permits bought in a region may not 
exactly equal the total number o f permits sold.
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aggregation, the soil-specific upper bounds per acre are multiplied by the number of acres of 
the soil in the region and then summed for all soils in the region (Table 21).
Typically, there is not much difference in the upper bound on regional leachate among 
policies. However, the threat of regional leachate exceeding harmful levels is either the 
smallest or next to the smallest under the permit schemes. The uniform restriction on expected 
leachate is the only policy that results in less of a threat, and that occurs only in the New York 
region. For example, the uniform restriction on expected leachate on all soils results in an 
upper bound of 3.11 million pounds of leachate with a probability of no more than 5% under 
the 10% reduction in expected regional leachate. This is compared to an upper bound of 3.14 
million pounds of leachate under the permit schemes. While the uniform restriction on 
expected leachate in New York may be the least threatening in terms of observing high 
leachate levels, it is the most threatening in Iowa when expected regional leachate is reduced 
by 10%. Similarly, the restriction on fertilizer is the most threatening in Iowa for a 25% 
reduction in expected regional leachate and in New York for a 10% reduction in expected 
regional leachate. Under the 25% reduction in expected leachate in New York, the tax on 
nitrogen fertilizer results in the highest upper bound on leachate for a given probability level.
Costs and Transfers. Regional net farm returns, public revenues, and the net costs of 
the individual policies, defined here as the decrease in net farm returns from the base case less 
any public revenues generated from the policies, are in Tables 22 and 23.34 It is no surprise 
that the tradable permit scheme results in the least net cost, approximately $2 and $7 million 
(or 1 and 2% of base net income) for the 10 and 25% reductions in leachate, respectively, in 
New York and $4 and $19 million (or 2 and 4% of the base net income) for the 10 and 25% 
reductions in leachate, respectively, in Iowa. The net cost of the permit policies should be 
lowest because under each of the permit mechanisms, farmers obtain permits in such a way that 
leachate occurs on those soils that have the highest returns from leaching. No other policy 
allows farmers as a whole to freely adjust nitrogen fertilizer and crop rotations among soils so 
that the regional reduction in leachate is achieved. The ordering of the net costs of policies 
other than those associated with permit schemes varies by region and the percentage reduction 
in expected leachate. Generally, the most costly policy is the uniform restriction on the 
fertilizer application rate, with regional costs of $2.3 and $10.1 million for the 10 and 25% 
reductions in leachate, respectively, in New York and $10.2 to $34.0 million for the 10 and
34 All costs and revenues reported in this section, unless otherwise stated, are the 
discounted present value of the costs and revenues over the 20-year time horizon.
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Table 21. Approximate Upper Bounds on Regional Leachate and Probability Levels under Different Policies
Region
% Decrease 
in Expected 
Leachate
Probability 
Upper Bound 
Exceeded
Upper Bound on Leachate ("thousand pounds)
Base
Fertilizer
Tax
Fertilizer
Restriction
Expected
Leachate
Restriction
Permit
Schemes
New York 1 0 % 0.05 3,497 3,140 3,146 3,107 3,138
Iowa 1 0 % 0.05 4,243 3,811 3,826 3,837 3,717
New York 1 0 % 0.25 3,215 2 , 8 8 8 2,891 2,857 2,885
Iowa 1 0 % 0.25 3,905 3,508 3,521 3,531 3,421
New York 25% 0.05 3,497 2,647 2,616 2,572 2,575
Iowa 25% 0.05 4,243 3,155 3,185 3,133 3,119
New York 25% 0.25 3,215 2,435 2,407 2,364 2,367
Iowa 25% 0.25 3,905 2,903 2,931 2,883 2,870
Table 22. 20-Year Net Farm Returns, Public Revenues, and Net Costsa o f the Policies ($ million)
Base
Case
Fertilizer
Tax
Restriction 
on Fertilizer
Restriction 
on Leachate
Sale at 
Fixed Price
Leachate Permits 
Auctioned Tradable
10% Reduction in Expected Leachate
NY Revenue
Farm 209 204 207 207 185 152 208
Public — 4 — — 23 55 —
Net Cost - 2 2 2 2 211 2
IA Revenue
Farm 482 443 472 473 399 352 478
Public — 33 — — 79 126 —
Net Cost 
25% Reduction
-  7 
in Expected Leachate
10 9 4 4 4
NY Revenue
Farm 209 200 199 201 167 152 202
Public — 0 — — 35 50 —
Net Cost - 9 10 8 7 7 7
IA Revenue
Farm 482 413 449 454 381 353 464
Public — 20 — — 83 111 —
Net Cost - 50 34 28 19 19 19
Net costs are calculated as the decrease in net farm returns from the base case less the public revenue generated.
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Table 23. Per Acre 20-Year Net Farm Returns, Public Revenues, and Net Costs3 o f  the Policies
Base
Case
Fertilizer
Tax
Restriction 
on Fertilizer
Restriction 
on Leachate
Sell at 
Fixed Price
Leachate Permits
Auctioned Tradable
10% Reduction in Expected Leachate
NY Revenue
Farm $1596 $1555 $1579 $1584 $1413 $1162 $1585
Public — 28 — — 172 423 —
Net Cost - 14 18 13 11 11 11
IA Revenue
Farm $2037 $1872 $1994 $1999 $1684 $1487 $2018
Public — 137 — — 335 532 —
Net Cost 
25% Reduction
-  27 
in Expected Leachate
43 38 18 18 18
NY Revenue
Farm $1596 $1528 $1520 $1534 $1278 $1162 $1543
Public — 0 — — 264 380 -
Net Cost - 68 77 62 54 54 54
IA Revenue
Farm $2037 $1743 $1893 $1917 $1608 $1489 $1958
Public — 83 — — 349 469 —
Net Cost - 211 144 120 79 79 79
a Net costs are calculated as the decrease in net farm returns from the base case less the public revenue generated.
25% reductions in leachate, respectively, in Iowa. An exception is that the fertilizer tax is the 
most costly policy for the 25% reduction in leachate in Iowa, with a net cost of $50 million.
Perhaps more important to policy makers is the distribution of the net costs of the 
policies between losses in net farm returns and gains in public revenues. For all cases 
considered, the greatest net costs are $211 per acre on a composite soil in the Iowa region for 
a fertilizer tax and $77 per acre on a composite soil in the New York region for a fertilizer 
restriction (Table 23). These costs represent only 18 and 7% of the land values in Iowa and 
New York.35
These percentage changes are substantially greater if one looks only at the costs to 
farmers (Table 24). By far the most costly policies to farmers as a whole within the regions
35 The land values used are USDA’s 1991 estimates of the state average value of farm land 
and buildings. They are $1157 in Iowa and $1031 in New York (New York Agricultural 
Statistics, 1992-1993).
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Table 24. Per Acre Costs o f the Policies to Farmers Expressed as a Percent o f Current Net Farm Returns and Farm 
Land Values on a Composite Soil
Restriction Permits Tradable
Restriction on on Sold at a Auctioned Permits
Fertilizer Tax Fertilizer Expected Fixed Permits Initially
Leachate Price Allocated
New York Reeion-10% Decrease in Expected Annual Leachate
Farm Cost ($) 42 18 13 183 434 11
% o f Farm Returns 3 1 1 12 27 1
% o f Land Value 4 2 1 18 42 1
Iowa Reeion—10% Decrease in Expected Annual Leachate
Farm Cost ($) 165 43 38 353 550 18
% o f Farm Returns 8 2 2 17 27 1
%  o f Land Value 14 4 3 31 48 2
New York Region—25% Decrease in Expected Annual Leachate
Farm Cost ($) 68 77 62 318 434 54
%  o f Farm Returns 4 5 4 20 27 3
%  o f Land Value 7 7 6 31 42 5
Iowa Region—25% Decrease in Expected Annual Leachate
Farm Cost ($) 294 144 120 428 548 79
% o f Farm Returns 14 7 6 27 27 4
% o f Land Value 25 12 10 47 47 7
Note: Current farm returns are the net returns associated with the base case for the New York and Iowa regions,
$1596 and $2037, respectively. Land values are the U.S.D.A. estimates for the average value per acre o f land and
buildings in New York and Iowa, $1119 and $1245, respectively (N e w  Y ork  A g r ic u ltu r a l S ta tis tic s , 1 9 9 2 -1 9 9 3 ) .
are the permits sold at a fixed price or at auction, especially those sold at auction. The 
economic stakes involved with these policies are high. On an average size crop farm of 315 
acres in the Iowa region and 218 acres in the New York region (1987 Census o f Agriculture), 
these permit schemes cost as much as $172,600 and $94,700, respectively. These costs 
represent about a 27% decline in a farmer’s current net returns. Land values, which will 
eventually reflect the losses in farm returns, would decrease 42 to 47%. One may argue that 
the government could redistribute the public revenues generated from these policies back to 
the farmers using a lump-sum transfer to bring the farmers’ costs down, but in reality such 
transfers may not work efficiently (Gardner, 1987).
Among the policies, the least costly to farmers is the tradable permit scheme with a free 
initial allocation of permits proportional to base leachate. Even for the 25% reductions in 
leachate, these costs represent only about 3 to 4% of current net farm returns and 5 to 7% of
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land values. On an average size crop farm with average soils, these costs would be $24,900 
in the Iowa region and $11,700 in the New York region. Among policies other than the permit 
schemes, farm costs are less than 15% of net returns or land values, with the exception of the 
fertilizer tax in Iowa for a 25% reduction in leachate.
SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The purpose of the research on which this bulletin is based is to develop an analytical 
framework for studying the effects of regulating nitrates that leach into groundwater from 
agricultural production. The bioeconomic models developed for this purpose account for 
management response for crop rotations and nitrogen fertilizer use and incorporate the 
dynamics and uncertainty surrounding both the agricultural production and nitrate leaching 
processes.
Because of the heightened interest in innovative, market-oriented approaches for 
resolving water pollution problems (EPA, 1993), much of the policy analysis centers around 
leachate permits as an instrument for reducing regional nitrate leachate. The implications of 
three permit schemes are also compared with more traditional instruments: a tax on nitrogen 
fertilizer and quantity restrictions on either fertilizer application or leachate.
The empirical analysis evaluates the performance of these policy options for two 
regions, one representative of agriculture in the Corn Belt and the other representative of 
agricultural areas in the Northeast. The Com Belt’s relatively homogeneous soils are among 
the most productive for growing com and soybeans; and because of the intensive use of 
fertilizer, groundwater is highly vulnerable to nitrate contamination. Parts of the Northeast are 
vulnerable as well, but soils are generally less homogenous and less productive. Corn and 
alfalfa are commonly grown in rotation to support dairy. Manure is a significant source of 
applied nitrogen in addition to inorganic fertilizer and contributes to the leaching problem. To 
the extent that the regions studied, Boone County in Iowa and Genesee and Wyoming Counties 
in New York, are representative of these major agricultural areas, the results of the policy 
analysis may be generalizable to other parts of the Corn Belt and the Northeast.
As the basis for the comparative analysis, current agricultural practices are identified 
on specific soils in the regions. These base scenarios reflect current crop rotations (40% alfalfa 
and 40% soybeans in New York and Iowa, respectively), which imply approximately 35 to 
40% less leaching than the leachate levels under continuous corn production. This substantial
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improvement in environmental quality is largely a by-product of using crop rotations to resolve 
weed and pest problems.
Once the base scenarios are identified, the different nitrate leachate reducing policies 
are compared both within and between regions. The regional net costs are identified under the 
various policies, along with the costs to farmers and public revenues generated.36
The Policy Implications
Throughout the empirical analysis, emphasis is placed on estimating what is at stake 
when reducing regional leachate by a given percentage. Generally in the Com Belt there is 
more at stake than in the Northeast. If annual expected leachate is reduced by 25% in the Iowa 
region, the leachate policies reduce net farm returns from 4 to 10%. In New York, these 
policies lead to only a 3 to 5% reduction in farm income. The differences in the costs between 
Iowa and New York are accounted for primarily by the productivity differences between the 
soils and the relative value of the legume crops in the two regions. Corn yields are more 
responsive to nitrogen fertilizer on Iowa soils, making the relative value of growing com 
compared with a legume higher in Iowa than in New York. Thus, as leachate is reduced, the 
costs, in terms of com yields from reduced fertilizer and/or the substitution of the legume crop, 
are relatively higher in Iowa than in New York.
As suggested by theory, the leachate permit schemes lead to the smallest net costs of 
any policy for both regions. However, the ranking of other policies by net cost differ by 
region and by the level of reduction in regional leachate, although the range in net costs is 
relatively narrow (3 to 10%). To illustrate the differences for a 25% reduction in expected 
annual leachate, the regional net costs associated with the three permit schemes are 3 and 4 % 
of net farm returns in the New York and Iowa regions, respectively. The costs of the other 
policies expressed as a percentage of net farm returns in the New York and Iowa regions, 
respectively, are: 4 and 10% for the fertilizer tax, 5 and 7% for the fertilizer restriction, and 
4 and 6% for the leachate restriction.
Because leachate permits are bought and sold on the basis of their value of production, 
one would expect that these schemes are the minimum net cost policy alternatives. However,
36 The costs and public revenues reported here are the discounted present values of 
expected costs and revenues over a 20-year time horizon. The regional net cost is defined as 
the decrease in the discounted present value of 20-year expected net farm returns to farmers 
less any public revenues generated under a policy.
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two of the permit schemes (the permits auctioned and sold at a fixed price) transfer substantial 
revenues from farmers to the public treasury. The permit auction, for example, extracts all the 
economic surplus that farmers gain from leaching nitrates and essentially leaves them 
indifferent between purchasing permits to grow some corn in rotation and growing all legume 
crops. Farmers’ costs under the permit auction are substantial, about 27% of 20-year 
discounted net returns in both regions. Similarly, if permits are sold at a fixed price, income 
transfers from farmers to the public are also substantial, ranging from 11 to 21% of discounted 
net farm returns. Based on the size of these transfers, it is unlikely that either of these 
alternatives would be politically acceptable.
In contrast, by regulating leachate through a system of tradable permits the net costs to 
the farm sector are much reduced—less than 4% of discounted net farm returns even for a 25% 
reduction in leachate; put differently, these costs represent between 5 and 7% of land values. 
Clearly, the chance of this scheme being politically acceptable is much improved, although 
there is substantial redistribution of income between buyers and sellers of permits. Any 
adverse distributional consequences are in part mitigated by allocating initial permits based on 
historical production patterns, a strategy consistent with how participation in other farm 
programs is determined.
The distributional consequences among farms are minimal for the fertilizer tax and for 
fertilizer and leachate restrictions. A tax, however, is particularly costly to farmers in Iowa, 
14% of net returns or 25% of the value of land. In contrast, the fertilizer and leachate 
restrictions lead to reductions in farm income only slightly larger than those for the tradable 
permits. Since these two policies rank closely behind the tradable permits, the desirability of 
each must turn on considerations other than net costs and farm costs. One major consideration 
is the differential impacts of the policies for the leaching on individual soils, particularly if it 
is in the public interest in some locations to restrict leachate on the most leachable or highly 
vulnerable soils. The other major consideration is administrative feasibility.
In this regional analysis, it is not possible to determine the exact linkage between 
leachate below the crop root zone on particular soils and the resulting increase in the nitrate 
concentration of the major drinking water sources within the region. Yet, if it is known that 
a localized aquifer is the primary source of drinking water for people in a region and that 
highly leachable soils lie above this aquifer, a policy that transfers leaching rights from these 
soils to other soils in the region could be an effective means of dealing with the contamination 
problem. In these extreme cases, it may be in the public interest to implement a permit scheme 
that would eliminate all corn production in such an area and perhaps compensate farmers in
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return. If specific soils are targeted using the policies analyzed in empirical analysis, then the 
fertilizer and leachate restrictions generally result in the least leaching on the more vulnerable 
hydrologic groups A and B soils. Even if these policies are implemented, there is still a small 
probability that leachate on the vulnerable soils may exceed harmful levels, as evidenced by 
the chance-constraint on nitrate leachate. But, by targeting vulnerable areas and transferring 
the leaching rights, this probability can be reduced further, if not to zero.
Similar targeting of agricultural contamination is being considered under the Coastal 
Zone Management Act. For example, Letson et al. (1993) examined the potential for trading 
pollution between point and nonpoint sources in coastal watersheds. Of the 35 areas in which 
nonpoint source agricultural pollution is a significant contributor to the pollutant loadings in 
the watershed, they found that trading would be feasible and improve water quality in 19 areas. 
Feasibility was measured primarily in terms of the farm and transactions costs associated with 
trading. More specifically, in order for trading to be feasible in a watershed, a few large 
nonpoint source polluters had to be present in order to keep the transactions costs of trading 
low, and the nonpoint source polluters (the farmers) had to have alternative land uses and 
technologies available so that the cost of abating nonpoint source pollution would be low.
The case for using a system of nitrate permits to target only selected areas where the 
"stakes are high" also makes sense from an administrative standpoint. The implementation of 
a permit policy that substantially reduces leachate in certain areas would mean that soils be 
classified according to their vulnerability and leaching potential. In addition, farmers would 
probably have to report production plans that include both fertilizer application rates and the 
number of acres producing individual crops.
In this sense the data requirements would be substantial, but in New York such a permit 
scheme might well be "piggy-backed" on the administrative infrastructure already in place for 
the state’s agricultural use-value assessment program, where farmland is already classified into 
10 different value groups based on estimated productivity. To apply for agricultural value 
assessment, a farmer is required to bring tax maps into the local ASCS office where the tax 
maps are overlaid on county soil maps in order to determine the farmer’s acreage in each of 
the state’s major soil mapping units (of which there are several hundred). Each soil mapping 
unit has been assigned to one of the 10 different value groups. The value of a farmer’s land 
for tax purposes is calculated by finding the farmer’s acreage in each of the value groups and 
summing the values for those acreages across groups (Gardner and Bills, 1991).
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Assigning each of the state’s soil mapping units to a group based on leaching potential 
would perhaps be even more difficult and contentious than assigning productivity classes, but 
the difficulties could be minimized by focussing on the soils only in those targeted areas where 
a source of groundwater is at risk. Substantial work is already underway in some states to rank 
soils by leaching potential as a management tool for farmers.
In addition, the idea of farmers registering production plans and fertilizer use is not 
new, and most of the administrative structure is in place. For example, to participate in 
government farm programs, farmers have had to register crop production on individual parcels 
in order to form base acreages and program yields. Also, provisions in the 1990 Food Security 
Act require farmers to register their use of certain chemicals.
Although there may well be a number of agricultural areas where extremely vulnerable 
groundwater supplies could justify the administrative expense of a permit system, other policies 
that are less costly administratively may be appropriate in areas where concerns about nitrate 
contamination are more general and less severe. Administratively, a leachate restriction would 
involve costs similar to those for the permit schemes because soil-specific production and 
leaching information would have to be known; but the tax on nitrogen fertilizer, for example, 
would be much less costly to implement. A fertilizer tax would simply require that fertilizer 
dealers collect the appropriate tax revenues from the farmers. A uniform restriction on the 
nitrogen fertilizer application rate could be administered by requiring farmers to register the 
number of acres of corn they are growing and limiting the amount of fertilizer a farmer can 
purchase by multiplying the number of acres of corn by the maximum fertilizer application rate 
allowed under the quantity restriction. These alternative policies are slightly less efficient in 
terms of their net regional costs, but the savings in administrative costs may well compensate 
for the difference.
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Table Al. Solution for I-B Soil in Iowa with No Leachate Constraint
Yr. x,* x2” x2 8, 8; 8, E(C,) E(C2) E(L)
0 115 150 300 0.300 0.300 0.400 145 125 15.1
1 158 200 399 0.400 0.598 0.002 152 152 30.1
2 158 193 399 0.002 0.996 0.002 152 152 29.9
3 158 193 399 0.002 0.996 0.002 152 152 29.9
4 158 193 399 0.002 0.996 0.002 152 152 29.9
5 158 193 399 0.002 0.996 0.002 152 152 29.9
6 158 193 399 0.002 0.996 0.002 152 152 29.9
7 158 193 399 0.002 0.996 0.002 152 152 29.9
8 158 193 399 0.002 0.996 0.002 152 152 29.9
9 158 193 399 0.002 0.996 0.002 152 152 29.9
10 158 193 399 0.002 0.996 0.002 152 152 29.9
11 158 193 399 0.002 0.996 0.002 152 152 29.9
12 158 193 399 0.002 0.996 0.002 152 152 29.9
13 158 193 399 0.002 0.996 0.002 152 152 29.9
14 158 193 399 0.002 0.996 0.002 152 152 29.9
15 158 193 399 0.002 0.996 0.002 152 152 29.9
16 158 193 399 0.002 0.996 0.002 152 152 29.9
17 158 193 399 0.002 0.996 0.002 152 152 29.9
18 158 193 399 0.002 0.996 0.002 152 152 29.9
19 158 193 399 0.002 0.996 0.002 152 152 29.9
20 155 191 397 0.002 0.996 0.002 151 151 29.7
Note: See text for a description o f  the variables.
Table A2. Solution for N-E Soil in New York with No Leachate Constraint
Yr. x,a x / x2 8 , s2 83 84 85 E(C,) E(C2) E(L)
0 53 153 300 0.300 0.301 0.133 0.133 0.133 17.2 15.8 1 1 . 8
1 2 0 133 315 0.133 0.599 0 . 0 0 2 0.133 0.133 16.8 16.2 13.5
2 2 0 135 315 0.133 0.730 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 2 0.133 16.8 16.2 15.8
3 2 0 136 315 0.133 0.861 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 2 16.8 16.2 18.1
4 2 0 136 315 0 . 0 0 2 0.992 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 2 16.8 16.2 17.4
5 2 0 137 315 0 . 0 0 2 0.992 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 2 16.8 16.2 17.4
6 2 0 137 315 0 . 0 0 2 0.992 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 2 16.8 16.2 17.4
7 2 0 137 315 0 . 0 0 2 0.992 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 2 16.8 16.2 17.4
8 2 0 137 315 0 . 0 0 2 0.992 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 2 16.8 16.2 17.4
9 2 0 137 315 0 . 0 0 2 0.992 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 2 16.8 16.2 17.4
1 0 2 0 137 315 0 . 0 0 2 0.992 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 2 16.8 16.2 17.4
11 2 0 137 315 0 . 0 0 2 0.992 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 2 Q. 0 0 2 16.8 16.2 17.4
1 2 2 0 137 315 0 . 0 0 2 0.992 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 2 16.8 16.2 17.4
13 2 0 137 315 0 . 0 0 2 0.992 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 2 16.8 16.2 17.4
14 2 0 137 315 0 . 0 0 2 0.992 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 2 16.8 16.2 17.4
15 2 0 137 315 0 . 0 0 2 0.992 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 2 16.8 16.2 17.4
16 2 0 137 315 0 . 0 0 2 0.992 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 2 16.8 16.2 17.4
17 2 0 137 315 0 . 0 0 2 0.992 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 2 16.8 16.2 17.4
18 2 0 137 315 0 . 0 0 2 0.992 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 2 16.8 16.2 17.4
19 19 137 315 0 . 0 0 2 0.992 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 2 16.8 16.2 17.4
2 0 15 129 307 0 . 0 0 2 0.992 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 2 16.7 16.0 17.0
Note: See text for a description o f variables.
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Table A3. Solution for I-B Soil in Iowa with No Leachate Constraint and a Minimum Soybean 
Rotation Imposed
Yr. x,a x2a x2 5, 52 s 3 E(c,) E(c2) E(L)
0 115 150 300 0.300 0.300 0.400 145 125 15.1
1 156 199 398 0.400 0 . 2 0 0 0.400 151 151 18.2
2 156 191 398 0.400 0 . 2 0 0 0.400 151 151 18.2
3 156 191 398 0.400 0 . 2 0 0 0.400 151 151 18.2
4 156 191 398 0.400 0 . 2 0 0 0.400 151 151 18.2
5 156 191 398 0.400 0 . 2 0 0 0.400 151 151 18.2
6 156 191 398 0.400 0 . 2 0 0 0.400 151 151 18.2
7 156 191 398 0.400 0 . 2 0 0 0.400 151 151 18.2
8 156 191 398 0.400 0 . 2 0 0 0.400 151 151 18.2
9 156 191 398 0.400 0 . 2 0 0 0.400 151 151 18.2
1 0 156 191 398 0.400 0 . 2 0 0 0.400 151 151 18.2
1 1 156 191 398 0.400 0 . 2 0 0 0.400 151 151 18.2
1 2 156 191 398 0.400 0 . 2 0 0 0.400 151 151 18.2
13 156 191 398 0.400 0 . 2 0 0 0.400 151 151 18.2
14 156 191 398 0.400 0 . 2 0 0 0.400 151 151 18.2
15 156 191 398 0.400 0 . 2 0 0 0.400 151 151 18.2
16 156 191 398 0.400 0 . 2 0 0 0.400 151 151 18.2
17 156 191 398 0.400 0 . 2 0 0 0.400 151 151 18.2
18 156 191 398 0.400 0 . 2 0 0 0.400 151 151 18.2
19 156 191 398 0.400 0 . 2 0 0 0.400 151 151 18.2
2 0 155 191 397 0.400 0 . 2 0 0 0.400 151 151 18.2
Note: See text for a description of the variables.
Table A4. Solution for N-E Soil in New York with No Leachate Constraint and a Minimum Alfalfa Rotation Imposed
Yr. x,a x2a x2 8 , s2 53 8 4 85 E(c,) E(c2) E(L)
0 53 153 300 0.300 0.301 0.133 0.133 0.133 17.2 15.8 1 1 . 8
1 19 131 313 0.133 0.468 0.133 0.133 0.133 16.7 16.2 1 1 . 2
2 19 133 313 0.133 0.468 0.133 0.133 0.133 16.7 16.2 1 1 . 2
3 19 133 313 0.133 0.468 0.133 0.133 0.133 16.7 16.2 1 1 . 2
4 19 133 313 0.133 0.468 0.133 0.133 0.133 16.7 16.2 1 1 . 2
5 19 133 313 0.133 0.468 0.133 0.133 0.133 16.7 16.2 1 1 . 2
6 19 133 313 0.133 0.468 0.133 0.133 0.133 16.7 16.2 1 1 . 2
7 19 133 313 0.133 0.468 0.133 0.133 0.133 16.7 16.2 1 1 . 2
8 19 133 313 0.133 0.468 0.133 0.133 0.133 16.7 16.2 1 1 . 2
9 19 133 313 0.133 0.468 0.133 0.133 0.133 16.7 16.2 1 1 . 2
1 0 19 133 313 0.133 0.468 0.133 0.133 0.133 16.7 16.2 1 1 . 2
1 1 19 133 313 0.133 0.468 0.133 0.133 0.133 16.7 16.2 1 1 . 2
1 2 19 133 313 0.133 0.468 0.133 0.133 0.133 16.7 16.2 1 1 . 2
13 19 133 313 0.133 0.468 0.133 0.133 0.133 16.7 16.2 1 1 . 2
14 19 133 313 0.133 0.468 0.133 0.133 0.133 16.7 16.2 1 1 . 2
15 19 133 313 0.133 0.468 0.133 0.133 0.133 16.7 16.2 1 1 . 2
16 19 133 313 0.133 0.468 0.133 0.133 0.133 16.7 16.2 1 1 .1
17 17 130 309 0.133 0.468 0.133 0.133 0.133 16.7 16.1 1 1 .1
18 2 0 135 315 0.133 0.206 0.395 0.133 0.133 16.8 16.2 6 . 6
19 19 133 315 0.133 0.337 0 . 0 0 2 0.395 0.133 16.8 16.2 8.9
2 0 15 126 307 0.133 0.468 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 2 0.395 16.7 16.0 1 1 . 0
Note: See text for a description of the variables.
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Table A5. Solution for 1-B Soil in Iowa with Nitrate Leachate Restricted by Prob[L > 20] < 0.05
Yr. x,‘ x2a x2 5, 52 S3 E(c,) E(c2) E(L)
0 115 150 300 0.300 0.300 0.400 144.8 125.1 15.1
1 127 170 369 0.400 0.174 0.426 147.5 147.5 16.4
2 127 165 369 0.426 0.147 0.427 147.4 147.4 16.4
3 127 165 369 0.427 0.146 0.427 147.4 147.4 16.4
4 127 165 369 0.427 0.146 0.427 147.4 147.4 16.4
5 127 165 369 0.427 0.146 0.427 147.4 147.4 16.4
6 127 165 369 0.427 0.146 0.427 147.4 147.4 16.4
7 127 165 369 0.427 0.146 0.427 147.4 147.4 16.4
8 127 165 369 0.427 0.146 0.427 147.4 147.4 16.4
9 127 165 369 0.427 0.146 0.427 147.4 147.4 16.4
10 127 165 369 0.427 0.146 0.427 147.4 147.4 16.4
11 127 165 369 0.427 0.146 0.427 147.4 147.4 16.4
12 127 165 369 0.427 0.146 0.427 147.4 147.4 16.4
13 127 165 369 0.427 0.146 0.427 147.4 147.4 16.4
14 127 165 369 0.427 0.146 0.427 147.4 147.4 16.4
15 127 165 369 0.427 0.146 0.427 147.4 147.4 16.4
16 127 165 369 0.427 0.146 0.427 147.4 147.4 16.4
17 127 165 369 0.427 0.146 0.427 147.4 147.4 16.4
18 127 165 369 0.427 0.146 0.427 147.4 147.4 16.4
19 127 165 369 0.427 0.146 0.427 147.4 147.4 16.4
20 126 164 368 0.427 0.148 0.425 147.1 147.1 16.4
Note: See text 3 for a description of the variables.
Table A6. Solution for 1-B Soil in Iowa with Nitrate Leachate Restricted by Prob[L > 10] < 0.05
Yr. x,a x2a x2 5, 52 s3 E(c,) E(c2) E(L)
0 115 150 300 0.300 0.300 0.400 145 125 15.1
1 125 168 367 0.284 0.002 0.714 147 147 8.2
2 125 162 367 0.284 0.002 0.714 147 147 8.2
3 125 162 367 0.284 0.002 0.714 147 147 8.2
4 125 162 367 0.284 0.002 0.714 147 147 8.2
5 125 162 367 0.284 0.002 0.714 147 147 8.2
6 125 162 367 0.284 0.002 0.714 147 147 8.2
7 125 162 367 0.284 0.002 0.714 147 147 8.2
8 125 162 367 0.284 0.002 0.714 147 147 8.2
9 125 162 367 0.284 0.002 0.714 147 147 8.2
10 125 162 367 0.284 0.002 0.714 147 147 8.2
11 125 162 367 0.284 0.002 0.714 147 147 8.2
12 125 162 367 0.284 0.002 0.714 147 147 8.2
13 125 162 367 0.284 0.002 0.714 147 147 8.2
14 125 162 367 0.284 0.002 0.714 147 147 8.2
15 125 162 367 0.284 0.002 0.714 147 147 8.2
16 125 162 367 0.284 0.002 0.714 147 147 8.2
17 125 162 367 0.284 0.002 0.714 147 147 8.2
18 125 162 367 0.284 0.002 0.714 147 147 8.2
19 125 162 367 0.284 0.002 0.714 147 147 8.2
20 125 162 367 0.284 0.002 0.714 147 147 8.2
Note: See text for a description o f the variables.
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Table A7. Solution for 1-B Soil in Iowa with Nitrate Leachate Restricted by Prob[L > 20] < 0.25
Yr. x,a x2a x2 8, s2 83 E(c,) E(c2) E(L)
0 115 150 300 0.300 0.300 0.400 144.8 125.1 15.1
1 145 188 387 0.400 0.200 0.400 150.3 150.3 17.7
2 144 181 386 0.400 0.200 0.400 150.2 150.2 17.7
3 144 181 386 0.400 0.200 0.400 150.2 150.2 17.7
4 144 181 386 0.400 0.200 0.400 150.2 150.2 17.7
5 144 181 386 0.400 0.200 0.400 150.2 150.2 17.7
6 144 181 386 0.400 0.200 0.400 150.2 150.2 17.7
7 144 181 386 0.400 0.200 0.400 150.2 150.2 17.7
8 144 181 386 0.400 0.200 0.400 150.2 150.2 17.7
9 144 181 386 0.400 0.200 0.400 150.2 150.2 17.7
10 144 181 386 0.400 0.200 0.400 150.2 150.2 17.7
11 144 181 386 0.400 0.200 0.400 150.2 150.2 17.7
12 144 181 386 0.400 0.200 0.400 150.2 150.2 17.7
13 144 181 386 0.400 0.200 0.400 150.2 150.2 17.7
14 144 181 386 0.400 0.200 0.400 150.2 150.2 17.7
15 144 181 386 0.400 0.200 0.400 150.2 150.2 17.7
16 144 181 386 0.400 0.200 0.400 150.2 150.2 17.7
17 144 181 386 0.400 0.200 0.400 150.2 150.2 17.7
18 144 181 386 0.400 0.200 0.400 150.2 150.2 17.7
19 144 181 386 0.400 0.200 0.400 150.2 150.2 17.7
20 144 181 386 0.400 0.200 0.400 150.2 150.2 17.7
Note: See text for a description of the variables.
Table A8. Solution for 1-B Soil in Iowa with Nitrate Leachate Restricted by ProbfL > 10] < 0.25
Yr. x,a x2a x2 8, s2 83 E(c,) E(c2) E(L)
0 115 150 300 0.300 0.300 0.400 144.8 125.1 15.1
1 125 168 367 0.309 0.002 0.689 146.9 146.9 8.9
2 125 162 367 0.308 0.002 0.690 146.9 146.9 8.9
3 125 162 367 0.308 0.002 0.690 146.9 146.9 8.9
4 125 162 367 0.308 0.002 0.690 146.9 146.9 8.9
5 125 162 367 0.308 0.002 0.690 146.9 146.9 8.9
6 125 162 367 0.308 0.002 0.690 146.9 146.9 8.9
7 125 162 367 0.308 0.002 0.690 146.9 146.9 8.9
8 125 162 367 0.308 0.002 0.690 146.9 146.9 8.9
9 125 162 367 0.308 0.002 0.690 146.9 146.9 8.9
10 125 162 367 0.308 0.002 0.690 146.9 146.9 8.9
11 125 162 367 0.308 0.002 0.690 146.9 146.9 8.9
12 125 162 367 0.308 0.002 0.690 146.9 146.9 8.9
13 125 162 367 0.308 0.002 0.690 146.9 146.9 8.9
14 125 162 367 0.308 0.002 0.690 146.9 146.9 8.9
15 125 162 367 0.308 0.002 0.690 146.9 146.9 8.9
16 125 162 367 0.308 0.002 0.690 146.9 146.9 8.9
17 125 162 367 0.308 0.002 0.690 146.9 146.9 8.9
18 125 162 367 0.308 0.002 0.690 146.9 146.9 8.9
19 125 162 367 0.308 0.002 0.690 146.9 146.9 8.9
20 125 162 367 0.308 0.002 0.690 146.9 146.9 8.9
Note: See text for a description o f the variables.
89
Table A9. Solution for N-E Soil in New York with Nitrate Leachate Restricted by Prob[L > 10] < 0.05
Yr. x,a x2a x2 8, 82 83 84 85 E(c,) E(c2) E(L)
0 53 153 300 0.300 0.301 0.133 0.133 0.133 17.2 15.8 11.8
1 0 80 262 0.133 0.346 0.255 0.133 0.133 16.4 14.5 8.2
2 6 111 288 0.133 0.322 0.157 0.255 0.133 16.5 15.5 8.2
3 17 131 309 0.133 0.258 0.197 0.157 0.255 16.7 16.1 7.4
4 0 87 268 0.255 0.167 0.224 0.197 0.157 16.4 14.8 8.2
5 7 109 291 0.157 0.285 0.137 0.224 0.197 16.5 15.6 8.2
6 13 123 303 0.197 0.222 0.220 0.137 0.224 16.6 15.9 8.2
7 0 91 273 0.224 0.207 0.212 0.220 0.137 16.4 14.9 8.2
8 8 112 292 0.137 0.311 0.120 0.212 0.220 16.5 15.6 8.2
9 11 118 298 0.220 0.195 0.253 0.120 0.212 16.6 15.8 8.2
10 0 95 277 0.212 0.222 0.194 0.253 0.120 16.4 15.1 8.2
11 8 113 293 0.120 0.333 0.101 0.194 0.253 16.5 15.6 8.2
12 9 115 294 0.253 0.154 0.299 0.101 0.194 16.6 15.7 8.2
13 2 97 280 0.194 0.244 0.163 0.299 0.101 16.4 15.2 8.2
14 8 113 293 0.101 0.360 0.078 0.163 0.299 16.5 15.6 8.2
15 7 113 291 0.299 0.093 0.367 0.078 0.163 16.5 15.6 8.2
16 2 96 281 0.163 0.286 0.106 0.367 0.078 16.4 15.2 8.2
17 3 104 283 0.078 0.402 0.047 0.106 0.367 16.4 15.3 8.2
18 6 111 288 0.367 0.002 0.478 0.047 0.106 16.5 15.5 8.2
19 0 89 276 0.106 0.367 0.002 0.478 0.047 16.4 15.1 8.2
20 0 88 265 0.047 0.472 0.002 0.002 0.478 16.4 14.7 8.2
Note: See text for a description of the variables.
Table A10. Solution for N-E Soil in New York with Nitrate Leachate Restricted by Prob[L > 5] < 0.05
Yr. x , a x 2a x 2 8, 82 83 84 85 E(C[) E(c2) E(L)
0 53 153 300 0.300 0.301 0.133 0.133 0.133 17.2 15.8 11.8
1 0 53 235 0.102 0.133 0.499 0.133 0.133 16.4 13.3 4.1
2 9 117 295 0.133 0.068 0.167 0.499 0.133 16.6 15.7 4.1
3 15 123 307 0.133 0.018 0.183 0.167 0.499 16.7 16.0 3.3
4 0 53 239 0.184 0.002 0.464 0.183 0.167 16.4 13.5 4.1
5 3 96 282 0.167 0.025 0.162 0.464 0.183 16.4 15.3 4.1
6 5 101 286 0.183 0.002 0.189 0.162 0.464 16.5 15.4 4.1
7 0 60 246 0.184 0.002 0.463 0.189 0.162 16.4 13.9 4.1
8 0 79 266 0.162 0.034 0.152 0.463 0.189 16.4 14.7 4.1
9 2 96 280 0.184 0.002 0.200 0.152 0.463 16.4 15.2 4.1
10 0 66 253 0.184 0.002 0.462 0.200 0.152 16.4 14.1 4.1
11 0 66 252 0.152 0.050 0.136 0.462 0.200 16.4 14.1 4.1
12 3 101 284 0.183 0.002 0.216 0.136 0.462 16.4 15.3 4.1
13 0 70 256 0.184 0.002 0.462 0.216 0.136 16.4 14.3 4.1
14 0 55 241 0.136 0.076 0.110 0.462 0.216 16.4 13.6 4.1
15 5 106 288 0.183 0.002 0.244 0.110 0.462 16.5 15.5 4.1
16 0 71 258 0.184 0.002 0.460 0.244 0.110 16.4 14.4 4.1
17 0 53 239 0.110 0.118 0.068 0.460 0.244 16.4 13.5 4.1
18 8 113 292 0.182 0.002 0.287 0.068 0.460 16.5 15.6 4.1
19 0 71 258 0.184 0.002 0.459 0.287 0.068 16.4 14.4 4.1
20 0 53 239 0.066 0.186 0.002 0.459 0.287 16.4 13.5 4.1
Note: See text for a description o f the variables.
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Table A l l .  Solution for N-E Soil in New York with Nitrate Leachate Restricted by Prob[L > 10] < 0.25
Yr. x,a x2a x2 5, §2 s3 §4 5, E(c,) E(c2) E(L)
0 53 153 300 0.300 0.301 0.133 0.133 0.133 17.2 15.8 11.8
1 0 92 274 0.133 0.393 0.208 0.133 0.133 16.4 15.0 9.1
2 3 105 283 0.133 0.385 0.141 0.208 0.133 16.4 15.3 9.1
3 17 131 309 0.133 0.355 0.163 0.141 0.208 16.7 16.1 9.1
4 0 97 277 0.208 0.287 0.201 0.163 0.141 16.4 15.1 9.1
5 5 107 286 0.141 0.368 0.126 0.201 0.163 16.5 15.4 9.1
6 14 125 304 0.163 0.321 0.189 0.126 0.201 16.6 15.9 9.1
7 1 99 279 0.201 0.293 0.190 0.189 0.126 16.4 15.2 9.1
8 6 110 289 0.126 0.386 0.109 0.190 0.189 16.5 15.5 9.1
9 12 121 299 0.189 0.291 0.221 0.109 0.190 16.6 15.8 9.1
10 2 100 281 0.190 0.306 0.174 0.221 0.109 16.4 15.2 9.1
11 7 111 291 0.109 0.408 0.089 0.174 0.221 16.5 15.6 9.1
12 10 118 296 0.221 0.251 0.266 0.089 0.174 16.6 15.7 9.1
13 3 102 283 0.174 0.326 0.145 0.266 0.089 16.4 15.3 9.1
14 7 112 291 0.089 0.434 0.066 0.145 0.266 16.5 15.6 9.1
15 9 117 294 0.266 0.193 0.330 0.066 0.145 16.6 15.7 9.1
16 4 103 285 0.145 0.363 0.095 0.330 0.066 16.4 15.4 9.1
17 7 112 291 0.066 0.465 0.043 0.095 0.330 16.5 15.6 9.1
18 7 114 291 0.330 0.108 0.424 0.043 0.095 16.5 15.6 9.1
19 2 97 281 0.095 0.436 0.002 0.424 0.043 16.4 15.2 9.1
20 0 93 270 0.043 0.529 0.002 0.002 0.424 16.4 14.9 9.1
Note: See Chapter 3 for a description of the variables.
Table A12. Solution for N-E Soil in New York with Nitrate Leachate Restricted by Prob[L > 5] < 0.25
Yr. x ,a x 2a x 2 5, s2 §3 s5 E(c,) E (c2) E(L)
0 53 153 300 0.300 0.301 0.133 0.133 0.133 17.2 15.8 11.8
1 0 53 235 0.079 0.202 0.452 0.133 0.133 16.4 13.3 4.5
2 10 120 296 0.133 0.096 0.186 0.452 0.133 16.6 15.7 4.5
3 15 124 307 0.133 0.025 0.204 0.186 0.452 16.7 16.0 3.4
4 0 53 238 0.205 0.002 0.403 0.204 0.186 16.4 13.5 4.5
5 3 96 283 0.186 0.027 0.180 0.403 0.204 16.4 15.3 4.5
6 5 101 286 0.204 0.002 0.211 0.180 0.403 16.5 15.4 4.5
7 0 60 246 0.205 0.002 0.402 0.211 0.180 16.4 13.9 4.5
8 0 80 266 0.180 0.038 0.169 0.402 0.211 16.4 14.7 4.5
9 2 96 280 0.204 0.002 0.222 0.169 0.402 16.4 15.2 4.5
10 0 66 253 0.205 0.002 0.402 0.222 0.169 16.4 14.1 4.5
11 0 66 252 0.169 0.056 0.151 0.402 0.222 16.4 14.1 4.5
12 3 101 284 0.204 0.002 0.241 0.151 0.402 16.4 15.3 4.5
13 0 70 256 0.205 0.002 0.401 0.241 0.151 16.4 14.3 4.5
14 0 55 241 0.151 0.085 0.122 0.401 0.241 16.4 13.6 4.5
15 5 106 288 0.204 0.002 0.272 0.122 0.401 16.5 15.5 4.5
16 0 71 258 0.205 0.002 0.400 0.272 0.122 16.4 14.4 4.5
17 0 53 239 0.122 0.131 0.076 0.400 0.272 16.4 13.5 4.5
18 8 113 292 0.203 0.002 0.320 0.076 0.400 16.5 15.6 4.5
19 0 71 258 0.205 0.002 0.398 0.320 0.076 16.4 14.4 4.5
20 0 53 239 0.074 0.207 0.002 0.398 0.320 16.4 13.5 4.5
Note: See text for a description o f the variables.
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APPENDIX B
STEPWISE LEACHATE PERMIT DEMANDS
The soil-specific, stepwise demands for leachate permits are calculated in the following
tables.
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Expected Leachate or Change in Objective Change in Quantity Permit Price 
Objective Function Permits Demanded Function (i) o f Permits (ii) (i)/(ii)
Table B .l Stepwise Demand for Leachate Permits on Iowa Soils
I-A Soil
1567.3122 16.1654
1566.2829 15.5016 1.0293 0.6638 1.55
1564.2541 14.2667 2.0288 1.2349 1.64
1561.8688 13.2871 2.3853 0.9796 2.43
1556.3019 12.2286 5.5669 1.0585 5.26
1550.2224 11.0726 6.0795 1.1560 5.26
1545.4694 10.1905 4.7530 0.8821 5.39
1538.2196 8.8581 7.2498 1.3324 5.44
1534.3800 8.1524 3.8396 0.7057 5.44
1526.1703 6.6435 8.2097 1.5089 5.44
1523.2905 6.1143 2.8798 0.5292 5.44
1514.1209 4.4290 9.1696 1.6853 5.44
1512.2011 4.0762 1.9198 0.3528 5.44
1502.0715 2.2145 10.1296 1.8617 5.44
1501.0187 2.0381 1.0528 0.1764 5.97
I-B Soil
2046.6298 18.2002
2043.8606 17.7408 2.7692 0.4594 6.03
2026.5699 16.9634 17.2907 0.7774 22.24
2008.3935 16.3502 18.1764 0.6132 29.64
1990.2121 15.7371 18.1814 0.6131 29.65
1983.8681 15.5232 6.3440 0.2139 29.66
1978.0881 15.3283 5.7800 0.1949 29.66
1947.6753 14.3065 30.4128 1.0218 29.76
1930.7225 13.7751 16.9528 0.5314 31.90
1915.7444 13.3056 14.9781 0.4695 31.90
1899.4238 12.7941 16.3206 0.5115 31.91
1882.4703 12.2627 33.2741 1.0429 31.91
1844.9507 11.0880 37.5196 1.1747 31.94
1817.1333 10.2189 27.8174 0.8691 32.01
1773.9721 8.8704 43.1612 1.3485 32.01
1751.7182 8.1751 22.2539 0.6953 32.01
1702.9936 6.6528 48.7246 1.5223 32.01
1686.3032 6.1313 16.6904 0.5215 32.01
1632.0151 4.4352 54.2881 1.6961 32.01
1620.8882 4.0876 11.1269 0.3476 32.01
1561.0366 2.2176 59.8516 1.8700 32.01
1555.4731 2.0438 5.5635 0.1738 32.01
I-C Soil
1942.2511 5.8710
1832.1162 4.3984 110.1349 1.4726 74.79
1802.6626 4.0195 29.4536 0.3789 77.73
1661.1218 2.1992 141.5408 1.8203 77.76
1646.3927 2.0098 14.7291 0.1894 77.77
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Table B .l Stepwise Demand for Leachate Permits on Iowa Soils (cont.)
Expected Leachate or Change in Objective Change in Quantity Permit Price
Objective Function Permits Demanded Function (i) of Permits (ii) (i)/(ii)
I-D Soil
2271.5696 16.2158
2271.3112 16.0910 0.2584 0.1248 2.07
2269.7345 15.8873 1.5767 0.2037 7.74
2266.7230 15.6836 3.0115 0.2037 14.78
2262.7005 15.4969 4.0225 0.1867 21.55
2256.3954 15.2763 6.3051 0.2206 28.58
2210.5193 14.2579 52.1812 1.2390 42.12
2162.8014 13.2830 47.7179 0.9749 48.95
2110.4280 12.2210 52.3734 1.0620 49.32
2052.0324 11.0692 58.3956 1.1518 50.70
2007.1639 10.1842 44.8685 0.8850 50.70
1939.7089 8.8554 67.4550 1.3288 50.76
1903.7599 8.1473 35.9490 0.7081 50.77
1827.3016 6.6415 76.4583 1.5058 50.78
1800.3399 6.1105 26.9617 0.5310 50.78
1714.8943 4.4277 85.4456 1.6828 50.78
1696.9198 4.0737 17.9745 0.3540 50.78
1602.4870 2.2138 94.4328 1.8599 50.78
1593.4998 2.0368 8.9872 0.1770 50.78
I-E Soil
1928.0806 16.5701
1911.4519 15.5051 16.6287 1.0650 15.61
1906.1916 15.2925 5.2603 0.2126 24.74
1880.9531 14.2730 25.2385 1.0195 24.76
1856.5997 13.2901 24.3534 0.9829 24.78
1850.1038 13.0496 6.4959 0.2405 27.01
1844.4993 12.8457 5.6045 0.2039 27.49
1833.2901 12.4379 11.2092 0.4078 27.49
1827.6856 12.2340 28.9141 1.0561 27.49
1795.8300 11.0750 31.8556 1.1590 27.49
1771.5855 10.1950 24.2445 0.8800 27.55
1734.7207 8.8600 36.8648 , 1.3350 27.61
1715.2783 8.1560 19.4424 0.7040 27.62
1673.5529 6.6450 41.7254 1.5110 27.62
1658.9711 6.1170 14.5818 0.5280 27.62
1612.3852 4.4300 46.5859 1.6870 27.62
1602.6640 4.0780 9.7212 0.3520 27.62
1551.2174 2.2150 51.4466 1.8630 27.62
1546.3568 2.0390 4.8606 0.1760 27.62
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Table B.2 Stepwise Demand for Leachate Permits on New York Soils
Objective Function
Expected Leachate or 
Permits Demanded
Change in Objective 
Function (i)
Change in Quantity 
of Permits (ii)
Permit Price
(i)/(ii)
N-A Soil
1672.1201 38.8630
1670.6098 37.4771 1.5103 1.3859 1.09
1661.9102 35.2061 8.6996 2.2710 3.83
1661.5377 35.1347 0.3725 0.0714 5.22
1648.1416 33.0057 13.3961 2.1290 6.29
1646.4311 32.7924 1.7105 0.2133 8.02
1626.9370 30.8053 19.4941 1.9871 9.81
1622.8899 30.4501 4.0471 0.3552 11.39
1601.2416 28.6049 21.6483 1.8452 11.73
1595.3137 28.1078 5.9279 0.4971 11.92
1574.7189 26.4046 20.5948 1.7032 12.09
1566.9176 25.7655 7.8013 0.6391 12.21
1547.6879 24.2042 19.2297 1.5613 12.32
1537.8157 23.4232 9.8722 0.7810 12.64
1519.3157 22.0038 18.5000 1.4194 13.03
1507.0478 21.0808 12.2679 0.9230 13.29
1489.3887 19.8034 17.6591 1.2774 13.82
1473.9344 18.7385 15.4543 1.0649 14.51
1456.7253 17.6030 17.2091 1.1355 15.16
1437.3740 16.3962 19.3513 1.2068 16.04
1421.4357 15.4027 15.9383 0.9935 16.04
1399.7899 14.0539 21.6458 1.3488 16.05
1386.1135 13.2023 13.6764 0.8516 16.06
1362.1466 11.7116 23.9669 1.4907 16.08
1350.7095 11.0019 11.4371 0.7097 16.12
1324.1422 9.3693 26.5673 1.6326 16.27
1314.4569 8.8015 9.6853 0.5678 17.06
1284.1839 7.0269 30.2730 1.7746 17.06
1276.9198 6.6011 7.2641 0.4258 17.06
1244.1452 4.6846 32.7746 1.9165 17.10
1239.2764 4.4008 4.8688 0.2838 17.16
1203.3968 2.3423 35.8796 2.0585 17.43
1200.8381 2.2004 2.5587 0.1419 18.03
N-B Soil
1681.9227 18.1628
1672.8029 16.6074 9.1198 1.5554 5.86
1665.5534 16.0089 7.2495 0.5985 12.11
1638.5399 14.5315 27.0135 1.4774 18.28
1617.9666 13.7219 20.5733 0.8096 25.41
1584.3656 12.4555 33.6010 1.2664 26.53
1556.6776 11.4349 27.6880 1.0206 27.13
1526.8950 10.3796 29.7826 1.0553 28.22
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Table B.2 Stepwise Demand for Leachate Permits on New York Soils (cont.)
Expected Leachate or Change in Objective Change in Quantity Permit Price
Objective Function Permits Demanded Function (i) o f Permits (ii) (i)/(ii)
N-B Soil (cont.)
1490.1028 9.1479 36.7922 1.2317 29.87
1462.7021 8.3037 27.4007 0.8442 32.46
1412.7892 6.8609 49.9129 1.4428 34.59
1390.7095 6.2278 22.0797 0.6331 34.88
1332.7583 4.5740 57.9512 1.6538 35.04
1317.5686 4.1518 15.1897 0.4222 35.98
1248.7062 2.2870 68.8624 1.8648 36.93
1240.8851 2.0759 7.8211 0.2111 37.05
N-C Soil
1765.0716 13.0924
1758.6966 12.3133 6.3750 0.7791 8.18
1736.6802 11.3836 22.0164 0.9297 23.68
1690.9747 10.2611 45.7055 1.1225 40.72
1636.1761 9.1069 54.7986 1.1542 47.48
1592.8392 8.2089 43.3369 0.8980 48.26
1524.4780 6.8302 68.3612 1.3787 49.58
1490.3356 6.1567 34.1424 0.6735 50.69
1407.5311 4.5534 82.8045 1.6033 51.65
1383.8131 4.1044 23.7180 0.4490 52.82
1286.4759 2.2767 97.3372 1.8277 53.26
1274.4419 2.0522 12.0340 0.2245 53.60
N-D Soil
1774.5453 35.8145
1773.4436 34.8735 1.1017 0.9410 1.17
1761.1118 32.5486 12.3318 2.3249 5.30
1760.0974 32.4281 1.0144 0.1205 8.42
1737.9271 30.2662 22.1703 2.1619 10.26
1737.3829 30.2237 0.5442 0.0425 12.80
1704.4076 28.1043 32.9753 2.1194 15.56
1700.8973 27.8988 3.5103 0.2055 17.08
1666.8708 25.9424 34.0265 1.9564 17.39
1660.3772 25.5739 6.4936 0.3685 17.62
1628.6755 23.7806 31.7017 1.7933 17.68
1619.2381 23.2490 9.4374 0.5316 17.75
1589.8308 21.6187 29.4073 1.6303 18.04
1577.2029 20.9241 12.6279 0.6946 18.18
1550.0661 19.4568 27.1368 1.4673 18.49
1533.8812 18.5992 16.1849 0.8576 18.87
1508.8624 17.2950 25.0188 1.3042 19.18
1489.1891 16.2743 19.6733 1.0207 19.27
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Table B.2 Stepwise Demand for Leachate Permits on New York Soils (cont.)
Objective Function
Expected Leachate or 
Permits Demanded
Change in Objective 
Function (i)
Change in Quantity 
o f Permits (ii)
Permit Price
(i)/(ii)
N-D Soil (cont.)
1467.0987 15.1331 22.0904 1.1412 19.36
1443.9387 13.9494 23.1600 1.1837 19.57
1424.6080 12.9712 19.3307 0.9782 19.76
1397.9716 11.6245 26.6364 1.3467 19.78
1381.8231 10.8094 16.1485 0.8151 19.81
1351.8439 9.2996 29.9792 1.5098 19.86
1338.7460 8.6475 13.0979 0.6521 20.09
1305.0821 6.9747 33.6639 1.6728 20.12
1295.2393 6.4856 9.8428 0.4891 20.12
1258.2608 4.6498 36.9785 1.8358 20.14
1251.6517 4.3237 6.6091 0.3261 20.27
1210.2162 2.3249 41.4355 1.9988 20.73
1206.7849 2.1619 3.4313 0.1630 21.05
N-E Soil
1449.5859 11.1514
1442.6305 10.2132 6.9554 0.9382 7.41
1424.3115 9.0904 18.3190 1.1228 16.32
1408.2365 8.1706 16.0750 0.9198 17.48
1380.5702 6.8178 27.6663 1.3528 20.45
1364.3304 6.1279 16.2398 0.6899 23.54
1317.9966 4.5452 46.3338 1.5827 29.28
1303.7512 4.0853 14.2454 0.4599 30.97
1243.9359 2.2726 59.8153 1.8127 33.00
1235.7070 2.0426 8.2289 0.2300 35.78
N-F Soil
1474.1380 17.1340
1472.5366 16.5689 1.6014 0.5651 2.83
1467.9643 15.9943 4.5723 0.5746 7.96
1448.3699 14.4978 19.5944 1.4965 13.09
1437.0729 13.7094 11.2970 0.7884 14.33
1417.9961 12.4267 19.0768 1.2827 14.87
1402.2615 11.4245 15.7346 1.0022 15.70
1383.9580 10.3555 18.3035 1.0690 17.12
1360.5438 9.1396 23.4142 1.2159 19.26
1343.0902 8.2844 17.4536 0.8552 20.41
1313.8687 6.8547 29.2215 1.4297 20.44
1300.7414 6.2133 13.1273 0.6414 20.47
1266.2129 4.5698 34.5285 1.6435 21.01
1256.6720 4.1422 9.5409 0.4276 22.31
1215.0366 2.2849 41.6354 1.8573 22.42
1210.1967 2.0711 4.8399 0.2138 22.64
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Expected Leachate or Change in Objective Change in Quantity Permit Price 
Objective Function Permits Demanded Function (i) o f  Permits (ii) (i)/(ii)
N-G Soil
Table B.2 Stepwise Demand for Leachate Permits on New York Soils (cont.)
1399.6750 12.9910
1397.9517 12.2975 1.7233 0.6935 2.48
1391.1055 11.3780 6.8462 0.9195 7.45
1381.5712 10.2479 9.5343 1.1301 8.44
1371.1762 9.1024 10.3950 1.1455 9.07
1361.5224 8.1983 9.6538 0.9041 10.68
1343.6844 6.8268 17.8380 1.3715 13.01
1332.1444 6.1488 11.5400 0.6780 17.02
1292.4754 4.5512 39.6690 1.5976 24.83
1281.1710 4.0992 11.3044 0.4520 25.01
1230.4717 2.2756 50.6993 1.8236 27.80
1223.5763 2.0496 6.8954 0.2260 30.51
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